

COMMONWEALTH C.16. OR ANARCHY?

A SURVEY OF PROJECTS OF PEACE

From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century

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BY

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NOTE

This book, originally published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd., in 1937, has already gone out of print. It is now reissued by the Oxford University Press, London, in conjunction with the Columbia University Press, New York, on the suggestion of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University and of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The text has been verbally revised and a few recent books have been added to the Appendix, but no substantial alterations have been made in the original text.

August 17, 1939.



PREFATORY NOTE

MANY books have been written on the subject of International Peace, but I know none that approaches the subject from the angle adopted in this little volume.

Its primary object is to set forth the more important 'Projects' which, during the last four centuries, have been formulated for the avoidance of international war. Those Projects cannot be studied to any purpose without some reference to the historical events that evoked them. This book, then, essays to set them against the appropriate historical background. But the background, be it understood, is very roughly sketched in, with only so much of detail as is essential to a comprehension of the Projects herein analysed. The bibliographical appendix should, however, enable less expert readers to fill in the background for themselves.

The method is throughout expository, not hortatory. My object is to explain, not to convince. There is indeed no need of preaching on this subject. Every sane person agrees that war is always horrible, generally stupid, and not infrequently wicked. But it has, unfortunately, ~~played a large part in~~ human history. During the ~~last~~ ^{past} four centuries wars have mostly proceeded from historical causes not previously operative. No Project for the elimination of war can be effective unless it takes account of them; it must eradicate the seeds of disease; not deal merely with its symptoms. With much Quaker blood in my veins, I detest war as cordially as William Penn himself. But as an historian and politician I have to confess with sorrow that none of the Peace Projects hitherto formulated have successfully grappled with the

problem. Is their failure due to defective machinery, or to the unregenerate nature of man? Readers of this book must draw their own conclusions from the facts which it attempts to summarize.

I ought to add that the idea of this little volume arose from a Short Course of Lectures delivered under the auspices of the University of London at Gresham College in May 1936. Some of those who heard the lectures desired their reproduction.

The main argument of the lectures was also summarized in an article I contributed to *The Quarterly Review* for July 1936. This book, then, derives from those two sources, and some few traces of the parents may be detected in the offspring.

A short bibliographical note will, I hope, sufficiently acknowledge the obligations I have incurred to previous writers, but I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. A. C. F. Beale, Lecturer in Education at King's College, London, not only for his valuable *History of Peace* (Bell, 1931), but also for his kindness in lending me his 'cuttings' containing M. Briand's scheme (1930) for *The United States of Europe*.

It is, perhaps, proper to add that the path trodden in this little book has occasionally led me on to tracks previously explored and described by me in many volumes. Where that is so I have not hesitated to borrow from my former self. But few readers will (it is to be feared!) detect any such repetitions, and none, I trust, will resent them. Rather than overload these pages I have, very occasionally, ventured to refer readers for fuller information to some of my previous works.


J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

LONDON,
March 23rd, 1937.

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PROLOGUE

DOES the world stand today on the brink of a catastrophe? The question, constantly reiterated, is variously answered. But all answers agree that the contemporary situation is one of appalling gravity. Such crises are apt to recur in world-history. A like situation evoked the despairing cry of the great prophet of the Hebrews: 'The way of peace they know not. . . . Therefore is judgment far from us, neither doth justice overtake us: we wait for light, but behold obscurity; for brightness, but we walk in darkness. We grope for the wall like the blind, and we grope as if we had no eyes; we stumble at noon day as in the night; we are in desolate places as dead men. . . . We look for judgment, but there is none; for salvation, but it is far off from us.' Salvation seems, in truth, to be far off from us today; the nations are groping in darkness; could they discern the light they would, for the most part, follow it; but they grope as if they had no eyes. Gladly would the rulers of the nations evolve a world-order out of the prevailing chaos. But they know not how. They wait for light, but behold obscurity.

Moreover, they and their peoples are suffering a cruel disappointment, a most painful disillusionment. During the four years' agony of the Great War they were sustained by a great hope. They were told, and believed, that, hideous as was the spectacle, it would never be witnessed again; that the World War would end war; that the suffering and sacrifice

would not be in vain; that they were fighting to secure a lasting peace among the peoples of the world:

‘Earth at last a warless world. . . .’

Warless! That was the vision of the poet half a century ago; that was the hope of the peoples in the World War. Bitter has been the disillusionment. Would it have been less bitter had statesmen been more restrained in utterance, less prodigal of promises, less anxious to proclaim general principles, and more intent on the prompt discharge of the business immediately in hand? It may be so. Disappointment, too, might have been minimized had more heed been given to the warnings of history. History might have recalled the fact that four times during the last four centuries has Europe been confronted by a crisis of exceptional magnitude; that the four great wars, or series of wars, have in each case been followed by an elaborate attempt to find a basis for organized and permanent peace.

The first of those Projects of Peace was put out in the name of Henry IV of France; the second was formulated, after the wars of Louis XIV had been ended by the Treaty of Utrecht, by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1713); the third—the Holy Alliance—originated in the brain of the Czar Alexander I, and was put forward when he and his allies were assembled to make peace in Paris, at the close of the Napoleonic Wars (1815); the fourth is the League of Nations, the Covenant of which was drafted during the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919. These Great War periods and the ensuing Projects of Peace came at regular intervals of a century.

Intermediately, there were a number of Projects, associated with the names of their respective authors. William Penn,

known to two continents as an ardent lover of peace and founder of the great colony of Pennsylvania, formulated a scheme in 1693. Rousseau edited and reduced to symmetry the rather rambling Project of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1761). Jeremy Bentham's plan was published in 1786-9 and Immanuel Kant's *Essay on Perpetual Peace* in 1795. And there were others.

All these Projects were specifically designed to solve a problem which had, it seemed, suddenly emerged in the sixteenth century. What was the precise nature of that new problem? Reduced to the simplest terms, it may be stated thus: How are a number of independent communities, Sovereign States acknowledging no common superior, to live side by side in harmony? Or, failing that, how can they settle their quarrels without recourse to the arbitrament of war? War is, indeed, no new phenomenon in history, but this specific problem did not arise until the sixteenth century. To the last four centuries, accordingly, the present enquiry will be confined.

In the year 1919 there was published by Mr. F. S. Marvin a little book entitled *The Century of Hope*. The period so designated was the hundred years between the battle of Waterloo and the outbreak of the World War. The title was justified. No sooner was the final Peace concluded in 1815 than hopes of reform, long deferred, suddenly revived. During the decade prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution reformers, stimulated by the success of the American rebellion, had been active both in and out of Parliament. All the points of the Charter were in fact anticipated in the programme of *The Society for Constitutional*

Information (1780). In 1784 Pitt introduced the first ministerial Bill for Parliamentary Reform. The hopes of the *illuminés*—the enlightened reformers—rose high in England as they did throughout the Continent. But the French Revolution brought reform to a standstill. For a whole generation the minds of men were necessarily concentrated on the problem—how to arrest the Revolution which the French republicans, like the Russian Bolsheviks, wished to extend to the whole of Europe; how to prevent the establishment of French domination under the 'New Charlemagne'. By 1815 the fears whether of a republican or a Napoleonic hegemony were dispelled. The English reformers could pick up the threads dropped in 1789.

Thus the 'Century of Hope' was initiated. Reforms, political, fiscal and social, followed each other in quick succession. Of these the most important, from the standpoint of international harmony, were the fiscal reforms, inspired by Cobden and Bright, and carried into effect by Sir Robert Peel. The Factory Acts, carried by the persistence of Tory reformers like Sadler and Lord Shaftesbury, were less to the liking of the Anti-Corn Law League than the fiscal reforms of Peel. But with the social legislation of Disraeli and R. A. (afterwards Viscount) Cross they did much for the appeasement of social discontent, and to justify the hopefulness of the nineteenth century. In many other directions the same spirit was manifested. Notably did that spirit inspire the men who, ever since 1815, had been working on schemes for the organization of International Peace. The Peace Movement, as a later chapter will demonstrate, suffered a check from the advent to power of Bismarck, and from the success which attended his policy of 'Blood and Iron'. But

by 1871 Bismarck's ambition was satisfied. He sought only to preserve by peace what he had gained by war, and consequently the Peace Movement regained, in the last decades of the century, its earlier vigour. Hope revived: for forty-four years the peace of Europe, except in the inflammable Balkans, was unbroken; wars in Africa, in Asia, and in America had, of course, their repercussions upon politics in Europe, but a great international conflict was postponed if not averted. The quickening of the social conscience combined with the rapid growth of material prosperity to promise a continuance of peace. On the other hand, the peacemakers viewed with alarm the erection of high tariff-barriers, the growth of armaments, and, above all, the stimulation of the war-spirit among the German people. Not, however, until August 1914 were the hopes of peace actually extinguished.

The devil was let loose. Darkness descended upon the earth, and gross darkness upon the peoples. But with the conclusion of the Armistice the flame of hope was relit, and in December 1918 Mr. Marvin could preface his little book with these words: 'If the war was the greatest so also was the world-alliance for humanity and international law which brought it to a victorious conclusion. So also, we believe, will the world-union be the greatest, and most permanent, which will arise from the devastated earth and the saddened but determined spirits who are now facing the future with a new sense of hope, which enshrines our sorrows and has overcome our most oppressive fears.'

Those words, without question, reflected faithfully the prevailing mood of the moment. Looking back upon a century of Hope, measuring the progress registered in the great days of Queen Victoria, men could look forward sti¹¹

more hopefully. Before their eyes there opened an even wider vision, the vision of illimitable improvement in the lot of humanity, of plenty for all, assured by unbroken peace.

Should *The Century of Hope* have a sequel, it must surely be published under a less alluring title: *Two Decades of Disappointment and Disillusionment*. The British are a peace-loving people. In 1914 they unsheathed the sword reluctantly but without hesitation, and in pursuit of no selfish ends. They had, indeed, much to lose by defeat, but nothing, save honour, to gain from victory. They went to war primarily to defend a small nation whose territory had been violated by one of the Great Powers which had guaranteed its integrity; to vindicate the sanctity of international treaties; and to help a friend whom they were under a moral obligation to assist, if and when the friend might be the object of unprovoked attack. Throughout the terrible years that ensued the British people were sustained by high hopes for the future of mankind. The war was surely destined to inaugurate a new era in world-history; treaties would henceforward be more than truces; they would be observed (as the Preamble to the Treaty of Kalisch had it) 'with that religious faith, that sacred inviolability on which depends the strength and the preservation of Empires'; the rights of the smaller and weaker nations would henceforth be respected equally with those of the Great Powers; not least, the principle of autocracy would be discredited by the defeat of the Central Empires, and a world, wrapped in perpetual peace, would at last be made safe for democracy. Can it be doubted that by such hopes a peace-loving people were steeled to endure the long agony of the war, that sore hearts were partially consoled for the sacrifices they were compelled to make?

And now! Seventeen years have passed since the Peace Treaty was concluded at Versailles. Nobody contends that the peacemakers were supermen, or that their work was flawless. Quite otherwise. Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues suffered the common fate of peacemakers. No Peace that was ever made at the close of a great war has answered expectations, or has in fact been in any degree commensurate with the sacrifices made to obtain it. The authors of the Peace of Utrecht were impeached; the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1763)—perhaps the most splendid that England ever made—were denounced by contemporary critics; the settlement of 1815 found few apologists until its virtues were revealed to a generation disappointed by the settlement of 1919. No Peace Settlement ever was, be it repeated, wholly satisfactory. But for some of the most disastrous consequences of the war which the Peace failed to repair, the peacemakers were in no way responsible. They were not responsible, for instance, for setting up the Soviet Republic in Russia, and if the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire was a blunder, it was a blunder committed before the diplomatists set foot in Paris. They did but ratify the decisions made by the subject peoples immediately concerned. And so on. It may well be that a less unsatisfactory settlement could have been made by professional diplomatists of more practical experience and less attached to pedantic formulae than the democratic politicians who made the Treaty of Versailles. Too much regard was doubtless paid to catchwords which run glibly from the lips of millions who are not endowed with the brains required to think out their implications. But, when all is said, it remains true that never did diplomatists approach a difficult task with more singleminded determination to apply principles to

practice, and to reconcile conflicting interests with a minimum of injustice to the parties concerned. The frontiers of Europe were in fact re-drawn in 1919 with a stricter regard for racial affinities, and for the wishes of the inhabitants, than had ever been attempted before. In those countries where the wishes of the inhabitants were in doubt—as for instance in Schleswig-Holstein and Silesia—plebiscites were ordered, were taken, and the results accepted, even when the results were favourable to a defeated enemy. Some frontier problems were and are insoluble. No human ingenuity could reconcile the long and rightfully cherished aspirations of the Poles with the interests of the Great Powers who, in the eighteenth century had robbed them of their country. It is impossible to give Poland indispensable access to the sea without infringing the integrity of Prussia—and so on. But let it be plainly said that the main responsibility for the unrest which has unhappily disturbed the world since 1919, lies on the war and the men who made it, much more than upon the well-meaning if fallible makers of the Peace.

Yet, to whomsoever we assign responsibility, the star fact remains. Disappointment and disillusionment have degenerated into despair; and particularly bitter has been the disappointment caused by the failure of the experiment from which most was hoped. The cement for the new structure erected at Versailles was supplied by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The refusal of the United States to ratify the handiwork of their President gave the new Peace Project a bad start, and it has never recovered from that initial disaster. The European statesmen at the Paris Conference ought, of course, to have realized that the American delegates were not plenipotentiaries, that they came

to Paris without any such mandate as an English Prime Minister can obtain, under the conventions of a Parliamentary Democracy, from a recent General Election. But only experts in Comparative Politics understand that American Democracy differs as fundamentally from English Democracy as the French Republic differs from the Soviet Republic in Russia. Nevertheless, though the error of the politicians at Versailles was venial, its consequences were disastrous.

Yet it is easy to imagine the torrent of abuse that would have been poured upon the heads of the peacemakers had they separated without an attempt to solve the problem that has baffled Europe for four centuries, and to devise some practical scheme for the organization of peace. This matter, as a later chapter will disclose, had been widely discussed in the United States before the war ended, and hardly less widely in England. All the great European wars since the sixteenth century had been followed by similar, if more restricted, discussions, and statesmen and philosophers had been at pains to work out detailed plans for the solution of a problem which each succeeding war, or series of wars, has made more and more urgent. All those plans bear a close family resemblance to that which in 1919 was formulated at Versailles. But not until 1919 was an attempt made to give practical effect to any theoretical Project of Peace. That the time was then ripe, who, with the horrors of the war fresh upon them, could doubt? If the fate of the experiment hangs at the moment¹ in the balance, that only affords an additional reason for an attempt to set forth the genesis of the problem, and to analyse the successive plans propounded for its solution. Such is the object of the pages that follow.

¹ May 1936.

II

THE MODERN ERA

THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

WAR is as old as human society; but the problem that now confronts the world, the problem of International War and International Peace, is essentially modern. Its genesis must be sought in the fundamental changes in world-economy which distinguished the later fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. That period is known to historians as 'The Era of the Renaissance and the Reformation'. The label is convenient and appropriate: the world then experienced a new birth; the Reformation tore into shreds the 'seamless garment of the Lord'.

Neither the ancient nor the mediaeval world had been peaceful: but the prolonged contest between France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs, inaugurated by Charles VIII in 1494, is commonly and rightly taken to mark the beginning of a new era in the history of war, and in the history of Politics. Henceforth wars were waged between nation and nation: the problem of peace was an international problem.

THE NATION-STATE.—The genesis of the problem, discussed in this book, is, then, closely associated with the evolution of a new political formation—the Nation-State. The Nation-State is itself the product of the modern era; the relation between Nation-States, sovereign, self-contained, and politically independent, is the problem with which modern statesmanship is pre-eminently concerned.

The State, as we conceive it, was unknown to the ancient world. The ancient world witnessed the rise and fall of great Empires: the City-State was its characteristic political formation; but of the intermediate form—the Nation-State—the ancient world knew nothing.

PAX ROMANA.—Alike in the Empires and in the City-States of antiquity fighting was the primary preoccupation of man. But the establishment of the Roman Empire did secure, for a large part of the known world, a period of peace. The *Pax Romana* has become proverbial. Within its own widely extended borders Rome imposed and maintained peace for at least two centuries. But, even then, there was constant fighting on the frontiers of the Empire, and after the death of Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 180) the *Pax Romana* was rudely broken, and the Empire entered on a disastrous period of political disintegration, social decay, civil wars and foreign invasions.

Hordes of Goths, Huns and Vandals broke through the frontiers, violated the soil of Italy, conquered and sacked the city of Rome. To Alaric the Goth, Rome opened its gates in 410; Attila the Hun occupied the city in 452; the Vandals under Genseric systematically plundered the Imperial City in 455.

The greatness of Rome passed, and upon its collapse there ensued a period of chaos and confusion.

Let it be recalled, however, that at its zenith the Roman Empire had given to the world a unity which had never before, and has never since, been so completely realized. Into that Empire were incorporated as citizens all the subject peoples of the provinces Rome conquered. "To the political

bond which thus united all the members in one body were joined its civil institutions and laws, which gave a new strength to those ties by determining in an equitable manner, clearly and precisely, or at least as far as possible in so vast an Empire, the reciprocal duties and rights of prince and subjects, and of citizen to citizen. The Theodosian code, and afterwards the law books of Justinian, were a new bond of justice and reason opportunely substituted for that of the Imperial Power, when it was being visibly relaxed. This fresh source of strength considerably delayed the dissolution of the Empire, and for a long time preserved to it a sort of jurisdiction over the very barbarians who were laying it waste.

‘A third bond, stronger than the aforementioned, was that of religion; and undeniably it is above all to Christianity that Europe still owes today such social sense as has survived among its members. So much so, that the only one of them that has not adopted the opinions of the others in this matter has always remained a stranger among them. Christianity, so despised at its birth, furnished in time an asylum for its detractors. After having persecuted it so cruelly and so vainly, the Roman Empire found in it resources which its own strength could not provide. Christian missions were of more avail than pagan victories. Rome sent out its bishops to retrieve the failures of its generals; its priests triumphed when its soldiers were beaten. Thus it was that the Franks, the Goths, the Burgundians, the Lombards, the Avars, and a thousand others finally recognized the authority of the Empire after they had conquered it, and made a show of accepting, along with the gospel law, the law of the prince who had made it known to them. . . . This is how the Church

and the Empire formed a social bond for various types of peoples who, without any real community of interests or of laws or of allegiance, had one of maxims and opinions whose influence remained when its basis had been destroyed. The ancient phantom of the Roman Empire continued to form a sort of liaison between the members who had composed it; and since Rome's dominion survived in another form after the destruction of the Empire, this double tie left a more closely-knit society amongst the nations of Europe . . . than ever existed in other parts of the world, where the different peoples, too scattered to get into communication, had moreover no focus of reunion.'

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.—This fine passage is quoted from Rousseau's famous essay, *A Project of Perpetual Peace*, about which more must be said later. His estimate of the influence of the Roman Empire upon mediaeval Europe was not exaggerated. When that Empire fell it bequeathed to the world the tradition of unity as embodied in a World-State and a Catholic or Universal Church. It bequeathed something more. The alliance concluded between the Emperor Constantine and the Catholic Church was an event of outstanding significance. Its significance was enhanced by the fact that Constantine transferred the imperial capital from the banks of the Tiber to the shores of the Bosphorus. Consequently, the fall of the Roman Empire of the West left the Bishop without a rival in Rome. But the Church needed a champion and protector. It was found in the Kings of the Franks, the vigorous people who in the course of the fifth and sixth centuries had established their ascendancy on both sides of the Rhine. Harassed by the repeated attacks of

the pagan Lombards, who in the latter part of the sixth century had established a great power in Northern Italy, the successors of St. Peter appealed to the Frankish Kings to come to the succour of Holy Church. As good Catholics the Franks responded. The Lombards could offer little resistance, and in 752 Pepin, King of the Franks, bestowed upon the Bishop of Rome the Exarchate of Ravenna, the last remnant of the Imperial patrimony in Italy. Thus did the Bishop of Rome become an Italian Prince: thus were laid the foundations of the Temporal Power. In return, King Pepin received the title of Patrician at the hands of a grateful Pope.

A still higher honour was reserved for his son. On Pepin's death (768) the Lombards renewed their attacks upon the Papal possessions. Again the Pope appealed for protection to the Franks. Again the Frankish King responded. Charlemagne, Pepin's son and successor, swept down upon the North Italian plain (773), blockaded the Lombard King in Pavia, and forced him to surrender. He then annexed Lombardy to his Empire and assumed the Lombard Crown. For a quarter of a century Italy had peace. But in 797 strife broke out between the new Pope Leo III (795-816) and the nobles in Rome; the Pope fled and took refuge with Charlemagne, King of the Lombards and Franks. Charlemagne marched without resistance to Rome, held a court of enquiry into the charges preferred against the Pope, declared him innocent, and reinstated him in the Papal chair.

The debt thus incurred by the Pope to his powerful protector was promptly repaid. On Christmas Day, 800, there took place in St. Peter's a ceremonial of the first historical importance. The King, having heard Mass, received at the

Pope's hands the Golden Crown and was declared Roman Emperor. The moment was opportune. The Imperial throne at Constantinople was occupied by a woman and a murderess. But once more there was an Emperor of the West; the union between the Church and the new Empire was consummated; henceforward the Empire was not merely Roman but Holy. The title survived for more than a thousand years: not until the advent of the 'New Charlemagne' was the Holy Roman Empire finally dissolved (1806).

The significance of that Christmas Day ceremony has been well brought out by two great historians. 'In Charles, the hero who united under one sceptre so many races, who ruled all as the vicegerent of God, the pontiff might well see, as later ages saw, the new golden head of a second image, erected on the ruins of that whose mingled iron and clay seemed crumbling to nothingness behind the impregnable bulwarks of Constantinople.' Thus wrote James (Viscount) Bryce, the famous author of *The Holy Roman Empire* (p. 47). 'The Coronation of Charles,' wrote Bishop Creighton, historian of the Papacy (i. 12), 'corresponded to the ambition of Latins and Germans alike. To the Latins it seemed to be the restoration to Rome and to Italy of their former glory; to the Germans it was the realization of the dream which had floated before the eyes of the earliest conquerors of their race.'

Charlemagne's¹ position was, however, unique. He was, in a sense, extra-national. His Coronation as Emperor was rather the recognition of a fact than the assertion of a claim.

Thus did the ancient world bequeath to mediaeval Europe the tradition of a world-power, an universal Empire. But

¹ To escape controversy and avoid wounding national susceptibilities I write 'Charlemagne' and 'Charles' interchangeably and indifferently.

the distinction conferred upon the King of the Franks, and from 962–1806 enjoyed by the Kings of Germany, was rarely more than titular; the Holy Roman Empire was little more than a phantom, a title borne by a Prince whose substantial power rested (notably in the case of the Hapsburg Emperors) upon the territories which they had acquired by conquest, marriage, or inheritance. Long before a New Charlemagne had arisen to destroy the pitiful remnant of a once imposing institution, the Holy Roman Empire had ceased, in Voltaire's cynical phrase, to be either Holy, or Roman, or an Empire. Nevertheless it had for at least six centuries preserved the tradition of European unity.

THE MEDIAEVAL PAPACY.—A much more powerful preservative was supplied by the Catholic Church. With all its lapses, and its occasional schisms, the Papacy did contribute to a distracted world an element of unity; the Roman Curia did constitute a Court of Appeal for the secular Princes of Christendom. The Princes did not always accept the full implications of the claim asserted by such Popes as Hildebrand (Gregory VII), Innocent III and Boniface VIII. English Kings in particular were apt to question the jurisdiction of a tribunal which in some measure circumscribed the embryonic nationalism of the insular kingdom. Yet even the strongest of English Kings—a William I, a Henry II, or an Edward I—were fain to acknowledge the existence, and up to a point the authority, of a supra-national tribunal.

Thus for more than a thousand years was a semblance of unity maintained in Christendom.

The ecclesiastical schism of the sixteenth century—the repudiation of Papal authority by the nations which accepted

Protestantism—effected a breach that was never healed. But many causes beyond ecclesiastical quarrels contributed to bring into existence a world that was definitely new.

THE RENAISSANCE.—Of that new world the indwelling spirit was one; the outward manifestations were many. Of those manifestations perhaps the most fundamental and far-reaching was the new birth of maritime enterprise leading to the discovery of new worlds and of new pathways to old worlds. Science was the handmaid of adventure. Without the discoveries of the astronomers, and the invention of the mariner's compass, the oceans would have remained trackless, and the enterprises of the great seamen would have been even more hazardous than they were. Thus the work of the astronomers, of the men who charted the heavens, of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe, of Kepler and Galileo, was clearly complementary to that of the men who charted unknown seas, to the terrestrial discoveries of Christopher Columbus and Bartholomew Diaz, of Vasco da Gama and the Cabots.

The initial voyages of these men all fell within the decades 1480–1500. What was the common impulse that sent these men forth, with practical simultaneity, from Spain, Portugal and England, on a quest for the discovery of an oceanic highway to the Far East? The immediate impulse was supplied by the conquests of the Ottoman Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the command they thus acquired over the ancient highways of commerce. For thousands of years the wares of the East, the gold, the spices, the silks of Asia, had reached Europe by way of Constantinople, the coast-towns of Syria and Palestine, and Egypt. Within a few years

of their conquest of Constantinople (1453) the Turks were in possession of all the great entrepôts of mediaeval trade. The old routes were effectually closed to the Christian nations of the West. Unless the Western peoples were prepared to give up the luxuries obtained from the East, and to forgo the high profits accruing to the merchants who traded therein, it was imperative to discover new routes which the Turk could not obstruct. In that quest Columbus stumbled on the West Indies, the Cabots on the coasts of North America, and the Portuguese mariners, Diaz and da Gama, gathering the fruits of scientific research conducted for a full century by their countrymen, reached and rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and thus opened to Portugal an Eastern Empire. Anxious to extend his jurisdiction to new worlds, and to avoid quarrels between the most faithful of his flock, the Pope Alexander VI issued, in 1493, his famous Bull, assigning the new world exclusively to Portugal and Spain, and defining their respective spheres. Not until England repudiated the jurisdiction of the Papacy could she, with safety, infringe the monopoly thus conceded by the Church to the Iberian Powers. Thus was trade diverted from the old routes. The Mediterranean, which for thousands of years had been the great highway of commerce and the centre of world civilization, became a mere backwater; the great cities washed by its waters sank into insignificance; as Lisbon, Bordeaux, London, Bristol, and Amsterdam waxed, Constantinople and Alexandria, Venice and Genoa waned.

Nor was the impulse derived from the Turkish conquests confined to commerce and maritime adventure. Its effect was not less marked on scholarship, criticism and literature. So long as Constantinople remained the capital of the

Eastern Empire, scholars clung to the shores of the Bosphorus. The advent of the Turk sent scholars scurrying with their manuscripts to the Italian cities. Florence, in particular, became the home of the 'new learning', the centre of the revived study of the language and literature of Ancient Greece. From Florence and Bologna Hellenic culture spread to Paris, Oxford and other Universities.

About 1496 John Colet began those lectures at Oxford which marked the opening of a new era in critical methods, and particularly in Biblical Exegesis. A devout Catholic, John Colet was the first and perhaps the greatest of the modernists; fearlessly applying to the interpretation of Scripture the canons prescribed by scientific criticism.

To explore, or even to catalogue, the recurring manifestations of the Renaissance spirit would be tedious, and in the present connection irrelevant. There remains, however, to be noticed the manifestation which, from the present standpoint, is the most important of all.

Europe began to take on, very slowly at first, something of its modern aspect. The Empire became more and more of a phantom; the Catholic Church lost its oecumenical authority; powerful monarchies arose and absorbed feudal principalities; administration was centralized, and the Royal Justice was systematized and extended. Thus was the way prepared for the advent of the new Nation-States into which the Europe of today is exhaustively partitioned.

NATION-STATES AND NATIONAL CHURCHES.—In England (for reasons which are the commonplace of historical criticism) a consciousness of nationality was precociously, if not prematurely, developed. By the end of the thirteenth century

England, under a national King and with a national Parliament, was definitely and consciously a Nation-State. The absorption of the Feudal Principalities, and the final expulsion of the English (1453), enabled France to reach the same stage by the end of the fifteenth century. The conquest of Granada, the final triumph of the age-long crusade of the Cross against the Crescent, the expulsion of the Moors, and the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella gave to Spain—all in the later years of the fifteenth century—a unity it had never known before. In 1516 Charles I (better known as the Emperor Charles V) became the first King of Spain.

A united, centralized, national monarchy in France was thus confronted by a Spain similarly united. Germany and Italy did not reach the same stage of political evolution until 1871, but in the meantime there had come into being a powerful Hapsburg Empire, a Prussian Kingdom, not to mention Russia (which became a European Power at the end of the seventeenth century) and a number of smaller Nation-States in northern and south-eastern Europe. But it was in the simultaneous consolidation of the two great Continental monarchies, France and Spain, and in their prolonged contest for ascendancy (1494–1713), that the genesis of the ‘international’ problem can be discerned.

In 1494 these two Nation-States were for the first time at war, and at war under successive sovereigns they continued to be, with short intervals, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Vervins in 1598. Nor was that Treaty, as the sequel will show, much more than a truce.

Meanwhile, a new factor had added to European politics a fresh complication. The spirit of nationalism had extended to religion. The year which witnessed the conclusion of

the Treaty of Vervins between France and Spain was memorable for the issue of an Edict which was intended to end the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in France. To discuss the implications of the Edict of Nantes would, in the present connection, be irrelevant. Suffice it to say that the Edict was no sanctification of the principle of toleration. It was a Treaty imposed by an exceptionally enlightened sovereign upon two powerful factions whom he hoped to comprehend in a united Nation-State. From that point of view the concessions, made in the Edict to the Protestants, proved to be too generous. The aristocratic leaders of the Huguenot party took advantage of the privileges conceded to them by Henry IV to establish a State within a State, and only the determined action of Cardinal Richelieu averted the political disruption of France. But this is to anticipate events. For the moment the Edict of Nantes was mainly significant as an illustration of the new factor which the Reformation had introduced into European politics. The unity of which the Catholic Church had been for centuries at once the symbol and the guardian had finally disappeared. The centrifugal forces had triumphed. Europe was breaking up into independent States, self-assertive and self-conscious, no longer speaking a common language, no longer acknowledging the jurisdiction of a supra-national tribunal, divided by differences of creed, stimulated to competition by the growing importance of overseas trade, and eager, in the lusty vigour of youth, to assert in arms their superiority to their neighbours.

Thoughtful men could not be blind to the dangers inherent in the new dispensation. It is indeed a delusion to suppose

that the Middle Ages were peaceful. Fighting was the main preoccupation of men. But except for the Crusades the fighting was mostly on a small scale and localized. Vassals fought their sovereign; this baron was at war with that; city fought city; the burghers of a number of federated cities took up arms against an oppressive lord, and so on. In the absence of Nation-States there could be no international wars. The sixteenth century changed all that. Europe was drenched in blood. Was there no prophylactic against a recurrence of that disaster? Was nation to be perpetually at war with nation? Were differences of creed, of clime, and race, to lead to constant shedding of blood?

The response to these questions came in successive 'Projects of Peace'.

III

THE GREAT DESIGN OF HENRY IV

THE grand original of all the Peace Projects ever seriously propounded is to be found in the *Design* attributed by the Duc de Sully to his master, Henry of Navarre. If the *Design* did in fact emanate from the brain of Henry IV, it must have been drafted before 1610 when the great King was assassinated by Ravallac. But the authorship of the *Design*, and other critical questions connected therewith, will be discussed presently. For the moment the only thing that matters is that the *Design* itself is definitely historical, and that the main outlines of it, if not the details, were familiar to those interested in such matters in the seventeenth century.

MORALISTS ON WAR.—Not that Henry IV was the first man to be appalled by the horrors of modern warfare, or to realize the absurdity of employing this means to settle disputes between nation and nation. The folly and wickedness of war were the commonplace of every moral philosopher and satirist from St. Augustine to Erasmus. Dean Colet, preaching before Henry VIII, had courageously quoted Cicero's aphorism: 'The most unjust peace is preferable to the justest war'. 'He preached', so Erasmus reports, 'wonderfully. . . . He showed that when wicked men, out of hatred and ambition, fought with and destroyed one another they fought under the banner, not of Christ, but of the devil. He showed, further, . . . how hardly possible it is for those who really have that brotherly love, without which "no one

can see the Lord," to thrust their sword into their brother's blood; and he urged, in conclusion, that instead of imitating the example of Caesars and Alexanders, the Christian ought rather to follow the example of Christ his Prince.' (Marriott: *John Colet*, p. 153 [1933].) Colet's denunciation of war was in no wise resented by his King and earned him the applause and gratitude of good men in many lands. Thus Maynard von Hatstein, one of the Canons of Mainz and according to Erasmus 'a most excellent young man,' wrote Colet a letter of grateful appreciation (1518). 'When recently the trumpet of cruel war sounded so terribly, how did you hold up against it the image of Christ! The olive branch of peace! . . . You told us that there was no cause of war between Christians . . . and thus did you discomfit the dark designs of your enemies. Men raging against the truth you conquered with the mildness of an apostle. You opposed your gentleness to their insane violence.' The tribute was just. Erasmus was less gentle than his friend Colet; the satire of *Folly* was more biting than the sermons of Henry's good Dean.¹ Against Pope Julius II and the rulers of the Catholic Church were *Folly's* shafts more particularly directed. 'Although war be a thing so savage that it becomes wild beasts rather than men, so frantic that the poets feigned it to be the work of the Furies, so pestilent that it blights at once all morality, so unjust that it can be best waged by the worst of ruffians, so impious that it has nothing in common with Christ, yet to the neglect of everything else they [the Churchmen] devote themselves to war alone.' Sir Thomas More shared with his friends Colet and Erasmus a whole-hearted detestation of war, but his denunciation of it was more discriminating than

¹ Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* was published in 1511.

that of Erasmus, the satire of the *Utopia* (1516) was more delicate than that of *The Praise of Folly*. Yet More devotes a substantial section of his *Utopia* to an exposure of the folly and wickedness of war. 'Warre or battel as a thing very beastly, and yet to no kinde of beastes in so much use as to man, [the Utopians] do deteste and abhorre. And contrary to the custome almooste of all other nations, they counte nothyng so muche against glorie as glorie gotten in warre.' Nevertheless both men and women practise themselves in the discipline of war, lest they should not be able to defend their own country against unprovoked attack, or give effective help to friends so attacked, or to 'deliver from the yocke and bondage of tyranny some people that be therewith oppressed.' In these causes the Utopians regarded war as legitimate, but they preferred to achieve their ends if possible by 'craft and deceit' rather than by bloodshed, since 'their chief and principal purpose in war is to obtain that thing which if they had before obtained they would not have moved battle'. If that should prove impossible, they wage war with such fury that the transgressor will not be likely to offend again. Many of their ideas about international disputes ran counter, however, to accepted conventions. They deemed it, for instance, less dishonourable to bribe their enemies to betray their own countrymen than to kill them, being convinced that the common folk who actually provide the cannon fodder are driven into battle by their princes. If fight they must, however, the Utopians will do it by mercenaries who make it their business and will be sure to meet mercenaries on the other side. Besides, the more mercenaries are killed the better. The world would be well rid of 'that foul, stinking den of that most wicked and cursed

people'. Nor will the Utopians have any conscripts in their own armies, which must be kept up by voluntary recruiting, though all citizens, of both sexes, must be trained to arms. Truces made with an enemy they faithfully observe, nor do they do injury to unarmed citizens (unless they be spies), or sack cities that surrender, or waste the land or destroy the crops of the enemy, since they be grown 'for their own use and profit'. The whole cost of war, however, they recover to the last farthing from the conquered enemy.

War, then, is the last resort in *Utopia*, and when Princes are content to decree justice, and to rule according to the rules of charity and righteousness, the last resort will be rarely reached. There is, of course, in More's brilliant essay a large element of satire, but satire is always employed in the service of good sense.

WILLIAM POSTEL.—More definitely belonging to the catalogue of Peace literature is *The Concord of the World*, published in 1543. The author, William Postel (1510–81), was a French soldier of vast erudition but unstable mental equilibrium: his whole being was indeed deeply tinged by mysticism, not to say by melancholia. Gravely perturbed by the breakdown of the mediaeval order, and especially by the prevalence of international war, Postel could not believe that God would fail to fulfil Himself in a manifestation of Divine unity on earth. But if so, He must, thought Postel, 'have chosen some agent on earth through whom the Divine purpose could be accomplished'. The simple-minded and pure-hearted mystic devoted years of his life to the search for that agent. He ultimately found him, not, as a faithful son of the Church might have been expected to find him,

in the Pope, but, by an elaborate process of genealogical deduction, in the King of France, whose descent he traced from Japheth the brother of Shem! *The Concord of the World* was followed up in 1551 by *Reasons for a Universal Monarchy*. That work, in the judgment of the lamented Cambridge scholar to whose researches most people (including the present writer) owe any knowledge they possess of Postel, established Postel's claim to be regarded as one of the earliest and most important exponents of the 'view that the best hope of international comity lay in the rise of a preponderating power'.¹ That view is not entirely obsolete. It was advanced in 1914 as a scientific justification for the war-declaration of Germany. Nor was it in the sixteenth century original to Postel.

DANTE.—A similar thesis had been maintained two centuries earlier by the great statesman-poet of Florence, Dante Alighieri. The situation in Italy in the fourteenth century anticipated, on a smaller scale, that of Europe in the sixteenth. Dante, 'weary of the endless strife of princes and cities, of the factions within every city against each other',² looked for a remedy to a revival of the world-empire of Rome in the person of a German prince. The Guelphs could not bring peace to a distracted Italy. In its temporal mission the Papacy had lamentably failed. Where Popes had failed an Emperor might succeed. And so in the *De Monarchia* Dante advances an elaborate argument in favour of an Empire or world-power. Independent sovereignties, he holds, are inconsistent with the maintenance of peace: 'between any two

¹ *Studies in Statecraft*, by G. Butler, Cambridge, 1920.

² Bryce: *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 265.

princes, one of whom is in no way subject to the other, contention may arise either through their own fault or that of their subjects. Wherefore, there must needs be judgment between them. And, since the one may not take cognizance of what concerns the other, the one not being subject to the other (for a peer has no rule over his peer), there must needs be a third, of wider jurisdiction, who has principedom over both. . . . Hence the necessity for a world-empire'. The Roman Empire was, indeed, ordained of God to secure tranquillity to mankind; the Emperors were the servants of their people; in subjecting the world to itself the Roman people attained to Empire by right, and that right was established and revealed by God-given victory in arms. Under that Empire, at the zenith of the Augustan monarchy, Christ Himself chose to be born. But Christ sanctioned the authority of that Empire not only by His birth, but by His death, accepting as judicially valid the sentence of Pontius Pilate. Nor did the subsequent institution of the Church impair the prior authority of the Empire. Church and Empire were alike ordained of God; both were dependent upon God; neither was subordinate to the other; each was in its separate sphere supreme: the supreme pontiff in the spiritual sphere ordained 'to lead the human race in accordance with things revealed to life eternal', the Emperor in the secular sphere ordained 'to guide humanity to temporal felicity in accordance with the teachings of philosophy'.

Such, in brief, is the main argument of Dante's famous treatise. But he insisted that a prior consideration must not be ignored. For the well-being of the world the first prerequisite is Justice; the most dangerous enemy to Justice is cupidity: 'when the will is not pure from all cupidity, even

though Justice be present, yet she is not absolutely there in the glow of her purity'. To execute justice the Ruler must empty himself of all selfish ambitions, and must 'render to each what is his due and must render it in the spirit of Christian charity'. Only in a monarchy can this be looked for. 'For the attainment of peace there must be one guiding or ruling power. And this is what we mean by Monarchy or Empire.' Monarchy, then, is necessary to the well-being of the world.

The Roman Empire supplied the need. The harmonious co-operation of the several members of the universal body politic was secured through the supremacy of the Roman law; but law is useless without an efficient executive to enforce it. To this thought Dante frequently recurs in the *Purgatorio*:

Che val, perchè ti racconciasse il freno
Giustiniano, se la sella è vota;
Senz' esso fora la vergogna meno. (vi. 88-90.)

Le leggi son, ma chi pon mano ad esse?
Nullo: perocchè il pastor che precede
Ruminar pu, ma non ha l' unghie fesse.
(xvi. 97-9.)

Soleva Roma, che il buon mondo feo,
Due Soli aver, che l'una e l' altra strada
Facean vedere, e del mondo e di Deo.
(xvi. 106-8.)

Only under the reign of law can the world enjoy true Liberty. But law implies a Sovereign. Sovereignty, however, as Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury perceived and insisted, need not be vested in an individual. The Great Leviathan may take the form of a Commonwealth. Sovereignty may be exercised by a Federal Assembly.

From the Florentine poet to the English philosopher may seem a far step, yet in logic it is an easy transition from the argument of the *De Monarchia* to that of *The Leviathan* (1651), and the transition is rendered the easier by the fact that in the interval the Duc de Sully had drafted, if he had not published, *The Great Design of Henry IV*.

THE GREAT DESIGN OF HENRY IV.—Much critical ingenuity has of late been expended upon the question of the authorship and even the authenticity of *The Great Design*. 'Some historians', says an American commentator,¹ 'have taken it seriously.' I will risk the commentator's contempt by frankly avowing that he may count me among those shallow-pated historians. I take *The Great Design* very seriously. It is not suggested that for the scheme, as we read it set forth today, complete and coherent, in Chapter XXX of Sully's *Memoirs*, Henry IV was responsible. That chapter may not even have been written by the Duc de Sully. But whatever be its origin, whether Sully himself formulated the *Design*,² in its final literary shape, or whether he merely jotted down in his *Memoirs* scattered hints that dropped from his master's lips, and gradually elaborated them in successive revisions of the *Memoirs*—these are disputable questions. Nor does it concern us for the moment to answer them. The point is, that *The Great Design* must be taken seriously, that to it we must trace the *fons et origo* of all the schemes put forward, from the seventeenth century to the twentieth, for the organization of permanent peace.

It may well be that Henry IV never heard of *The Great*

¹ C. H. Hayes *ap. Ency. Brit.* (s.v. Sully).

² It is set forth in vol. iv. c. xxx. (pp. 217–59) (Bohn's Edition), and has been reprinted mainly from that edition in the Grotius Society Publications, No. 2, with an admirable Introduction by Mr. David Ogg (London, 1921).

Design. It may be that Sully—or perhaps later commentators and editors—with the obvious and pardonable purpose of securing publicity for their Project of Peace, posthumously attributed its authorship to a great King. With the same object the author or editor of the *Design* assigned a large share of the credit to a sovereign not less enlightened than Henry IV of France—Queen Elizabeth of England. Sully declared that if Henry was not beholden to Elizabeth for his thought of the *Design* it is quite certain that ‘this Great Queen had herself conceived it long before’ (p. 230.) Sully added, quite mendaciously, that Henry communicated the *Design* by letter to Elizabeth, and that their common interest in the Project suggested the idea of a meeting between the sovereigns to discuss it. That meeting, Sully admits, did not take place, but he declares that he himself journeyed to England and discussed with the Queen the argument of the treatise.

‘I found her’, he wrote, ‘deeply engaged in the means by which this great design might be successfully executed; and, notwithstanding the difficulties which she apprehended in its two principal points, namely, the agreement of religions and the equality of the powers, she did not appear to me at all to doubt of its success, which she chiefly expected, for a reason the justness of which I have since been well convinced of; and this was that, as the plan was really only contrary to the design of some princes, whose ambitious views were sufficiently known to Europe, this difficulty, from which the necessity of the design more evidently appeared, would rather promote than retard its success. She further said that its execution by any other means than that of arms would be very desirable, as this had always something

odious in it: but she confessed that indeed it would be hardly possible to begin it any other wise. A very great number of the articles, conditions, and different dispositions are due to this queen, and sufficiently show, that in respect of wisdom, penetration, and all the other perfections of the mind, she was not inferior to any king the most truly deserving of that title.'

These interviews and conversations existed only in the imagination of Sully, or perhaps only in the imagination of his ingenious editor.

It matters little whether *The Great Design* originated in the brain of Henry IV, or of Queen Elizabeth, or of the Duc de Sully. Péréfixe, who wrote a popular history of Henry IV in 1661, gives a summary of the argument of *The Great Design*, and categorically attributes it to Henry IV. The Abbé de St.-Pierre, writing in 1713, treats the *Design*, not as the vision of an imaginative memoir-writer, but as an authentic historical document, and upon it he confessedly based his own *Project for Perpetual Peace* (1713). Echoes of *The Great Design* may be caught in Kant's famous *Essay on Perpetual Peace* (1795), and Rousseau, in his essay on the Abbé de St. Pierre, said characteristically that if *The Great Design* was not 'good enough for Europe it was because Europe was not good enough for *The Great Design*'. Moreover, the scheme itself, if not in the technical sense 'authentic', was not unhistorical. At the lowest it reflected the policy of Henry IV, who unquestionably contemplated a grand alliance, headed by France, against the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs. Cynical commentators have, indeed, discerned in *The Great Design* nothing less, and nothing more, than the skeleton of such an alliance, smeared over with some empty verbiage,

and exalted by the imaginative genius of Sully to the dignity of a Project for Universal Peace. But, putting critical questions aside, we may get to the *Design* itself.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT.—Passing over a long introduction containing some ‘general reflections on the French Monarchy and the Roman Empire,’ we may summarize its main argument as follows:

For the wars which had devastated Europe in the sixteenth century—more particularly the civil wars—religious differences had been mainly responsible. Evidently, then, the first thing to be done was to eliminate that cause of strife. By the end of the century the opportunity had seemingly arrived: the ecclesiastical position was fairly stabilized. Excluding Muscovy, which was to be classed with Turkey as a barbarous country belonging less to Europe than to Asia, Europe was divided between three religions: the Roman, the Reformed (Calvinist), and the Protestant (Lutheran). Italy and Spain are virtually unanimous in adherence to Rome; France also is predominantly Roman with a small minority of ‘Reformed’; England, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and Switzerland are Protestant with an admixture of Roman; in the German States all three religions exist side by side.¹ Italy and Spain being so nearly unanimous may reasonably compel their small Protestant minorities to conform or depart. Elsewhere, there should be ‘unrestrained liberty’.

But all that Sully appears to mean by ‘Liberty unrestrained’ is that there should be no attempt on the part either of

¹ On the principle of *Cujus regio ejus religio*, i.e. that each Prince determined the creed of his subjects.

Protestant or Catholic countries to force their own religion upon their neighbours. In order to ensure this, each nation which has adopted one of the three creeds should be 'strengthened in the principles it professes, as there is nothing in all respects so pernicious as a liberty in belief. Those nations, on the other hand, whose inhabitants profess several creeds should be careful to observe the rules necessary to remedy the ordinary inconveniences of a toleration in other respects beneficial.'

Having thus eliminated the main course of strife, Sully proceeds to set forth his constructive scheme.

Europe (excluding Russia and Turkey) was to be repartitioned into fifteen States equal in status, and not too unequal in territory and material power—since inequality is the cause of envy and fear. Of these fifteen States six would be under hereditary monarchs, five (including the Empire and Papacy) under elective monarchs, and four would be Republics. All these States were to come together in a single Federation, and were to contribute their respective quotas to a common Defence Scheme.

These common military forces were to be at the disposal of the Federation, and to these forces and to other incidental expenses all the constituent members of the Federation were to contribute in proportion to their several abilities. The respective quotas would ultimately be fixed by the Federal Senate or Council, but, meanwhile, it was suggested that the contribution should be as follows:

The Pope: 8000 foot, 1200 horse, 10 cannons and 10 galleys; the Emperor and the Circles of Germany: 60,000 foot, 20,000 horse, 5 large cannons and 10 galleys; France: 20,000 foot, 4000 horse, 20 cannons and 10 ships; Spain,

Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Poland were to make contributions similar to those of France, but as regards sea-service, 'in the manner most suitable to their respective conveniences and abilities therein'; other contributions were to be as follows:

	<i>Foot.</i>	<i>Horse.</i>	<i>Cannons.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>
King of Bohemia .	5,000	1,500	5	—
King of Hungary .	12,000	5,000	20	6
Republic of Venice .	10,000	1,200	10	25
King of Lombardy (Duke of Savoy) .	8,000	1,500	8	6
Swiss Republic .	15,000	5,000	12	—
Dutch Republic .	12,000	1,200	12	12
Italian Republics .	10,000	1,200	10	8

The total force would thus amount to about 260,000 foot, 90,000 horse, 200 cannon, and 120 ships, equipped and maintained at the expense of the constituent States, each contributing according to its assigned proportion. The expense of such an international force would, it was contended, be inconsiderable as compared with the forces usually kept on foot by the several Sovereigns 'to awe their neighbours or perhaps their own subjects'.

The international force might also be used for the conquest of 'such parts of Asia as are most commodiously situated and particularly the whole coast of Africa which is too near to our territories for our complete security'. But none of these extra-European countries was to be annexed by any Great Power. They might be formed into new Kingdoms, and brought into the Federation, but they were to be placed immediately under different Princes other than those who 'before bore rank among the Sovereigns of

Europe'. There were, in fine, to be no Colonial dependencies annexed for the future.

The Emperor was to be the first and chief magistrate of the whole Christian Republic; he was to continue to be elected by the present electors but never twice running from the same house. The Hapsburgs were to be deprived of all their possessions in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, but to be guaranteed in possession of Spain, with its European islands, and all its overseas possessions in Africa, Asia and America, together with 'any discoveries hereafter made in those parts'. The German territories of the Hapsburgs were to be divided between Venice, Switzerland, Bavaria, Baden,¹ Wurtemberg,¹ Anspach¹ and Dourlach¹; Bohemia, enlarged by the addition of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia (an interesting anticipation of Czechoslovakia), was to become an elective Kingdom; Hungary, also under an elective King, was to be strengthened as the 'barrier of Christendom against the infidels' by adding to it the Archduchy of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and whatever might subsequently be acquired in Transylvania, Bosnia, Croatia and Slavonia. The electors to this important throne were to be the Pope, the Emperor, Kings of France, England, Denmark, Sweden and Lombardy, and they were to choose a prince distinguished for capacity in arms and thus well qualified to defend Europe against the Turks. The same rulers were to elect the Kings of Poland, which was to be extended by 'annexing to it whatever might be conquered from the infidels adjoining to its own frontiers, and by determining in its favour those disputes which it had with all its other neighbours'. Switzer-

¹ Members of the Evangelical Union (1608) of which Henry IV was the godfather.

land, augmented by Franche-Comté, Alsace and the Tyrol, was to be 'united into a sovereign republic'. In Italy, the Pope was to be recognized as a secular prince, ranking as such with the other sovereign princes of Europe, and to add to St. Peter's patrimony, Naples, Apulia, Calabria and all their dependencies. The Pope was to bear the title of Immediate Chief of the Italian Republic and to receive homage from the vassal republics of Venice (augmented by Sicily), Genoa, Florence, Mantua, Modena, Parma and Lucca, as well as from Bologna and Ferrara, which were to be Free Cities. Thus did Sully anticipate the scheme propounded in 1847 by Gioberti—an Italian Federation under the presidency of the Pope. The Duke of Savoy was, however, to be completely independent, with the title of King of Lombardy—a territory united with Savoy. In this redistribution only the two authors of the scheme (Henry IV and Elizabeth) were to go empty-handed, save that a few districts—Artois, Hainault, Cambrai, Tournay, Namur and Luxemburg—were to be annexed to the Crown of France, the rest of the Spanish Netherlands being erected into the Belgic Republic. Elizabeth was not to get any Continental acquisitions, since it was recognized by that wise Sovereign that 'the Britannic isles . . . had never experienced any great disappointments or misfortunes, except when their sovereigns had meddled in affairs outside their own little continent . . . their happiness appears to depend entirely on themselves without having any concerns with their neighbours . . .' Truly, 'Isolationism' *in excelsis!*

The government of the Federated States of Europe was to be vested in a General Council or Senate modelled on the Amphictyonic Council of Ancient Greece. The Senate was

to consist of sixty-six plenipotentiaries triennially nominated by the constituent States of the Federation as follows: four delegates each by the Pope, the Emperor, the Kings of France, England, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Lombardy and Poland, and the Venetian Republic, and two from each of the rest.¹ The Senate was to be in perpetual session, but to appoint various sub-committees, which were to be strictly subordinate to the Senate. From their decisions there was always to be an appeal to the Senate.

The Senate was to determine its own procedure, but its main functions would be to make laws and ordinances for the Federation, to keep the constituent States up to their engagements, to adjust, on an equitable basis, the details of the territorial partitions, to 'deliberate on any affairs that might occur; to discuss the different interests, pacify the quarrels, clear up and determine all the civil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with its neighbours.'

Important points still to be determined were, the place of meeting, whether the Senate should have a fixed location, or be ambulatory, and whether it should sit as a single body, or be divided into three Grand Committees of twenty-two members each. If in three, one Division should sit permanently at Paris or Bourges, and the other two 'somewhere about Trent and Cracow'. If the Senate should sit as an undivided whole, its place of meeting, whether fixed or ambulatory, should be localized in some central city or cities, such as Metz, Luxemburg, Nancy, Cologne, Mayence, Treves,

¹ Sully's arithmetic, here as elsewhere, seems faulty, since two delegates from each of the remaining five States would not make up the suggested total. The King of Hungary, despite his importance, has dropped out.

Frankfort, Wurzburg, Heidelberg, Spires, Strasburg, Bâle or Bezançon.

Such in outline was the famous *Design* as it comes down to us in Chapter XXX of Sully's *Memoirs* in the new edition published in 1745 by the Abbé de l'Ecluse des Logues. The most recent and most erudite editor of the *Design* suggests that the Abbé may have been the first, by collecting the scattered references to a Great Design in the earlier editions, to give it the appearance of a coherent plan.¹ But be this as it may, *The Great Design* went through five editions between 1745 and 1778, and was by general consent 'elevated to the dignity of a philosophical system' (Ogg).

Meanwhile, one or two points in reference to the territorial distribution of Europe call for a passing reference. Though the Emperor is retained in a position of great dignity, no provision is made for an Imperial domain. The title is presumably to be borne either by a non-territorial Prince, or, in addition to his hereditary dominions, by the Sovereign of one of the constituent States—though not twice in succession of the same State. Of Prussia there is no mention at all. Naturally, since in the time of Henry IV there was no King of Prussia, and the Elector of Brandenburg (of whom, more curiously, there is no mention) had not yet absorbed the insignificant Dukedom of East Prussia. Neither Russia nor Turkey belonged at that time to the European system, and are properly excluded from the proposed European Federation. The omission of the King of Hungary from the list of nominators of the Senate is probably accidental.

But these are details of no great importance. What is

¹ This is Mr. Ogg's suggestion, *op. cit.*

important is that the *Design* should (whatever its origin, and whatever the motives of its originator) be taken seriously. Sully himself maintained that the scheme was 'in no wise chimerical', nor had he any misgivings as to Henry's ability to convince his brother sovereigns of its utility and feasibility, the more so as Henry proposed to relinquish voluntarily and for ever all power of augmenting his own dominions; not only by conquest but by every other just and lawful means. 'Thus would he best convince men of his own complete disinterestedness, and that the scheme would save them from the expense of great military establishments; force them for ever from the fear of those bloody catastrophes so common in Europe; procure them an uninterrupted repose; and finally unite them all in an indissoluble bond of security and friendship, after which they might live together like brethren.'

To recapitulate the main features of *The Great Design*. Religious differences were to be eliminated as a cause of war; no single Power was to be left in a position to dominate Europe, still less to aspire to universal monarchy; Europe was to be a federation of States, equal in status and as far as possible in power; the government of the Federation was to be vested in a Senate which was to have at its disposal a common fund and an international force; the stronger would thus be restrained and the weaker protected, nor was any Great Power to be allowed in future to acquire extra-European colonies or dependencies.

Is there any reason for refusing to take this scheme at the face value claimed for it by the Duc de Sully? Unquestionably it represents the first detailed plan for the elimination of war as an instrument of policy, the first detailed project for the organization of perpetual peace.

It not only formed the basis of all the theoretical schemes subsequently formulated by philanthropists and philosophers, but has supplied the model for one Project that has taken practical shape. The *Design* lacks, indeed, the Court of International Justice which constitutes the most important practical achievement of the League of Nations. On the other hand, it laid down, in elaborate detail, the contributions to be made by the constituent States to an international military establishment. In this respect the League of Nations has fallen short of its theoretical progenitor, and has thus, as some critics hold,¹ condemned itself to impotence. But that is a controversial question which, at this stage, must be avoided. It must suffice, for the moment, to have vindicated Sully's claim to have formulated a scheme which, 'chimerical' or not, is of real historical significance.

¹ Notably Lord Davies: *The Problem of the Twentieth Century* (London, 1930).

IV

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

PERPETUAL WAR AND GROPINGS AFTER PEACE

*Emeric Crucé: Hugo Grotius: Thomas Hobbes:
The Abbé de Saint-Pierre*

BETWEEN the assassination of Henry IV (1610) and the death of Louis XIV (1715) there was an interval of just over a century. It was a period marked, on the one hand, by almost continuous war; on the other, by several notable Projects of Peace. Of the latter, much the most important was the *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle* propounded in 1713 by C. I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, Abbot of Tiron. But it was not the first.

A CENTURY OF WAR.—These Projects of Peace must be considered against the dark background of almost perpetual war. One of the most terrible and devastating wars in all history broke out in Germany in 1618 and was ended only by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In its origin the Thirty Years' War was precipitated partly by the political condition of the decadent 'Empire', and partly by the ecclesiastical disputes, which, since Luther's famous 'protest' (1517), had divided Germany. Divided ecclesiastically, virtually partitioned among a large number of Sovereign principalities, devoid of intelligible frontiers, and, above all, handicapped by its connection with the Holy Roman Empire, Germany had never been a united nation.

By the seventeenth century power was passing from an

Emperor, whose position was less and less that of a World-Potentate, and more and more that of the hereditary ruler of the heterogeneous States which subsequently played so great a part in European politics as the Hapsburg Empire. As regards German politics the final result of the Thirty Years' War was to establish the territorial Princes—the Electors, Archbishops and Bishops, Dukes, Landgraves and other magnates—as the effective rulers of Germany. Until the Napoleonic Wars the Sovereign States of Germany exceeded three hundred in number, though less than a dozen of them counted internationally. Ecclesiastically, the Thirty Years' War ended the religious wars in Germany, and left its States divided between the three creeds, Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist. But the last phase of the war was chiefly remarkable as a continuation, mainly on German soil, of the duel, dating from 1494, between France and the Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs. The Treaty of Westphalia did not finally close that contest: it was continued until, in 1659, the protagonists came to terms in the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

France then emerged an easy victor. Her ascendancy in Europe during the next half century was assured. By 1659 France had virtually reached *les limites naturelles*—the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine—declared by Richelieu to be the ultimate object of his foreign policy and the height of his ambition for his country.

Louis XIV, who, after a long minority, took up the reins of power in 1661, was not satisfied with the position achieved for France by her three great statesmen, Sully, Richelieu and Mazarin. He wanted for France something more than national security behind scientific frontiers; he lusted after ascendancy in Europe.

In pursuance of that ambition Louis spent the rest of a long reign in almost continuous war. His marriage with the Princess Maria Theresa of Spain tempted him to claim for her and himself the whole of the vast, but decadent and weakly defended, empire of Spain. Detached parts of it seemed, indeed, essential to the security of France. The possession of Belgium, Luxemburg and Franche-Comté brought the Spanish, or more strictly the Hapsburg, frontiers too near to Paris. For Northern Alsace and all Lorraine, except the three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, were still part of the Empire. So was Strasburg, the great fortress which commanded the road from Vienna to Paris. There was, then, much rounding off to be done to make the eastern frontier of France secure.

Louis XIV looked, however, beyond the limits of security. His ambition was not even bounded by territorial acquisitions. Like all the greatest of his predecessors, and like the great Corsican who came after him, Louis XIV worshipped the golden image of the Emperor Charlemagne, and if the Emperor Leopold had died before the insensate policy of Louis had united Europe against France, the French King would almost certainly have been elected Emperor. But his immediate ambition was to obtain the Spanish inheritance. The first step was the War of Devolution (*Jus Devolutionis*, 1667-8), which secured for France the Flemish fortresses, and would have brought her much greater gains had not Holland, England and Sweden combined to snatch from Louis the fruits of Turenne's great victories.

It was only a check. The insolent merchants of Amsterdam must learn what it was to thwart the ambition of a King of France. The War of 1672-8 was initiated to teach them; but

before it closed, Louis found himself at war not with Holland only, but with the Empire, with Brandenburg-Prussia, and with other German princes, including the Rhine Electors, and with Spain. Holland emerged from the war practically unscathed; Spain had to foot the bill. She surrendered to France Franche-Comté, now at long last finally incorporated in France, and a long line of strong fortresses extending from Dunkirk to the Meuse. Thus was the eastern frontier of France immensely strengthened.

It was further strengthened by the acquisition in 1681 of Strasburg, which thenceforward for two hundred years gave France a back-door into Germany. Two years later Luxemburg was seized by the French. But Europe was becoming seriously alarmed by this unbroken series of annexations, and William III, Prince of Orange, brought into power in Holland by the French invasion in 1672, utilized the sentiment to form the League of Augsburg, with the object of maintaining the *status quo* in Europe.

The League was reinforced in 1688 by the adhesion of England. In that year William and Mary succeeded to the English throne, and in 1689, England embarked on that prolonged contest with France which, after many vicissitudes of fortune, was finally decided in 1815 on the field of Waterloo. The fight between England and France begun in 1689 went on with no more than a breathing space (1697–1702), until, in 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht brought the so-called War of the Spanish Succession to a close. It was at Utrecht, during the Peace negotiations, that the Abbé de Saint-Pierre published his famous *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle*.

Details do not concern and must not detain us. The sole purpose of the preceding paragraphs is to indicate the blood-

bespattered background against which we must place the Projects of Peace.

EMERIC CRUCÉ'S 'LE NOUVEAU CYNÉE.'—The first of these was published only five years after the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, and some forty years before the publication of the first series of Sully's *Memoirs*. The author of it was another Frenchman, Emeric Crucé (1590–1648), a devout Roman Catholic, perhaps a priest.¹ His book, printed in 1623, bore the following title and inscription:

'Le Nouveau Cynée² ou Discours d'Estat représentant les occasions et les moyens d'establir une paix generale, et la liberté du commerce par toute le monde Aux Monarques et Princes Souverains de ce Temps. Cr. Par. A Paris, chez Jacques Villery, au Palais, sur le peron royal. MDCXXIII. Avec Privilège du Roy.'

Peace, says Crucé, is in reality a counsel of prudence. 'There are indeed those who care so little for strangers that they think it a prudent policy to sow divisions among them, in order that they themselves may enjoy more certain quiet. But I think differently, and it seems to me that when one sees a neighbour's house on fire or tumbling down, one has as much cause for fear as for compassion, since human society is a body, all of whose members are in sympathy, in that the sickness of one must needs be communicated to the others. This little book, therefore, contains a policy of universal application, useful to all nations alike and agreeable to those who have some ray of reason and feelings of humanity.'

¹ For Crucé cf. T. W. Balch: *Emeric Crucé* (Philadelphia, 1900), and G. Butler: *Studies in Statecraft* (Cambridge, 1920).

² Cyneas was a Thessalian orator and sage employed on diplomatic missions by Pyrrhus, King of Epirus (318 B.C.).

Having thus commended Peace in general terms as a 'Policy of Prudence', Crucé proceeds to analyse some of the special benefits to be derived from Peace. Not the least is Economic prosperity.

'If', he writes, 'we could obtain a universal peace, the finest fruit of it would be the promotion of commerce. On that account Monarchs ought to make provision for their subjects to trade without fear by sea as well as by land. . . .' To this end, watch should be kept on the means of communication by rivers great and small, and by cutting canals, and keeping the highways of the sea safeguarded against pirates. Every possible encouragement should also be given to the practical arts, to the exact sciences, and to the promotion of a sense of fraternity and human solidarity among all peoples. Not least important is the principle and practice of toleration for every creed.

Given such a policy there are, he contends, no real obstacles to peace, domestic, international or inter-religious. In order to promote perpetual peace between different nations, Crucé suggests a permanent conclave of ambassadors, to sit permanently in some neutral city, Venice for choice, and there 'settle any differences that might arise by the judgment of the whole assembly. If anyone refused to abide by the decrees of so notable a company he would be disgraced by all the other Sovereigns who would find means to bring him to reason.' The question of precedence in such a conclave might, Crucé apprehends, give rise to serious trouble, but he tentatively suggests the following Table: The Pope, the Emperor of the Turks ('especially as he holds the city of Constantinople which is the twin equal of Rome'), the Christian Emperor, the Kings of France and Spain; 'the sixth place can be con-

tested between the Kings of Persia, China, Prester John, the Precop of Tartary and the Grand Duke of Muscovy.' There follow the Kings of Great Britain, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Japan, Morocco, the Great Mogul and other monarchs from India and Africa, 'all brave princes who maintain themselves and do not depend on anyone.'

After referring to the decrees of the Amphictyonic Council, and to the functions of the Druids as respected arbitrators among the independent princes of Gaul, Crucé proceeds: 'Nevertheless, never was a Council so august, nor assembly so honourable as that of which we speak, which would be composed of ambassadors of all the monarchs and Sovereign republics who will be trustees and hostages of public peace. And the better to authorize it, all the said Princes will swear to hold as inviolable law whatever should be ordained by the majority of votes in the said assembly, and to pursue with arms those who would wish to oppose it. This Company therefore would judge the disputes which would arise not only about precedence but about other things, would maintain the ones and the others in good understanding; would meet discontents half-way and would appease them by gentle means, if it could be done, or in case of necessity by force.'

Evidently, says Butler, Crucé 'had a firm grasp of the principle that it must not merely be the function of a League of Nations to adjudicate upon disputes, but rather to foresee and dissipate the causes of hostility.'¹ In another respect Crucé showed wise foresight. He realized that world conditions were not static but dynamic. 'We do not yet know all the countries of the habitable earth. . . . Nothing can preserve an empire,

¹ G. Butler: *Studies in Statecraft* (Cambridge, 1920), p. 102.

except a general peace, the principal means of which consist in the limitation of the monarchies, so that each Prince remains within the limits of the lands that he possesses at present, and that he does not pass beyond them on any pretence. And if he finds himself offended by such a restriction let him consider that the limits of the kingdoms and lordships are set by the hand of God, who takes them away and transfers them when and where it seems good to Him. . . . If a Prince has cause of complaint let him address himself to this great assembly, as to the most competent judge that can be imagined. This is the principal way of establishing universal peace, and all others depend upon it. In this way a beginning can be made. For so long as sovereigns remain separated . . . they will try to aggrandise themselves. But if they are content with their present fortunes . . . if they unite with the body of this assembly of which they are members, there is nothing that can retard a good peace, or break it.'

HUGO GROTIUS: 'DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS.'—This summary of Crucé's argument should suffice to make it clear that in the history of Peace literature he occupies a very important place. Sully was actually writing his memoirs at the moment when *Le Nouveau Cynée* was published, and it is difficult, therefore, to ignore the suggestion that Sully may have been considerably indebted to Crucé in the elaboration of his own plan. That Hugo Grotius was indebted to Crucé is almost certain. Grotius, who in 1619 had been sentenced in his own country to lifelong imprisonment, had managed to escape, and arrived in Paris in 1621, just two years before the publication of Crucé's work. In 1625 the great Dutch jurist published his own immortal treatise *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. To the

importance of that work the world has paid such ample tribute that it demands only a passing reference here. Grotius's, says Mark Pattison, 'was the first attempt to obtain a principle of right and a basis for society and government outside the Church or the Bible.' He obtained it by applying to the relations between State and State the principles which govern, under municipal law, the rights and obligations of individual citizens. Every political society is, he held, based upon contract between its members. By contract the members emerge from the State of Nature wherein they had wandered about in the world as individuals. 'These members also move amongst themselves within their society by contract. So can and should move all the political societies within the great human society: for the plan of the world includes societies or states, as well as individuals or citizens, with all the relative inequalities of the latter, and contract involves the idea of right, of justice, and always of obligation and good faith. Wherever, therefore, in international affairs there is an absence of contract, or, there being contract, justice is wanting and bad faith prevails, anarchy or war alone will exist. War . . . is nothing else than the procedure available when the judgments of tribunals cease to have force or are without jurisdiction. . . . And, as in the case of private or personal wrong-doing, the wrong-doing nation should first offer to submit to independent arbitration, and only if this offer should fail can the warfare be righteous.'¹

Grotius may be said without exaggeration to have founded by a single work a new science. 'He produced', wrote Sir James Mackintosh, 'a work which we may now, indeed, justly deem imperfect, but which is perhaps the most com-

¹W. S. M. Knight: *Hugo Grotius*, pp. 220-1, 196-7.

plete that the world has yet owed, at so early a stage in the progress of any science, to the genius and learning of one man.’¹ A modern jurist goes further: ‘The *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*’, wrote Dr. Baty, ‘practically exhausted the theoretical arguments in favour of the new subject. . . . He [Grotius] sublimated the feelings of his age, and having arrived at the pure substance, the work of proving the need of his subject was disposed of for all time.’²

‘It was Grotius,’ writes a still more recent critic, ‘who may be said to have inaugurated a law of peace. . . . Not content with rounding off the conclusions of his precursors [he] completed their work by envisaging a law of peace capable of governing the whole life of States and individuals. . . . It is not the actual contents of that law of peace conceived by Grotius—the sources of which must be sought in the Bible and the classical writers—which has achieved the conquest of the world; it is this idea, that before anything else of a legal nature be attempted, the world needs a complete system of juridical norms reflecting international and social justice. And the idea at the basis of this Grotian thought was as simple as it was profound, that the rules of conduct governing the actions of individuals must also be those governing the actions of the Powers, of the Governments.’³

These tributes are just; but it is proper to add that as a pioneer Grotius had to blaze a trail, and that occasionally he lost the right direction, as, for instance, when he confused *jus gentium* and *jus naturae*—the law of nations and the law of nature. But the outstanding importance of the contribution which he made to the cause of international peace lay in this:

¹ *Miscellaneous Works*, i. 351.

² *ap. Ency. Brit.* s.v. Grotius.

³ C. Van Vollenhoven: *The Law of Peace* (Eng. trs.), p. 192.

Accepting the stark facts of the modern world, perceiving that the world was henceforward to consist not of a World-Empire and a World-Church, but of a Society of Sovereign States, he maintained that unless war was to be the normal condition of the world the new nations must learn to live side by side and must recognize the supremacy of international law as not less binding upon them as nations than municipal law upon their respective citizens. Even in war, law stands, said Grotius, above force; much more in peace.

HOBBS: 'LEVIATHAN.'—Contract, then, was, according to Grotius, the cement of society—the ladder (to vary the metaphor) by which man had climbed out of the state of nature. Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury based his Theory of the State upon the same principle. His *Leviathan* was written during the troubled period of the Great Rebellion and was published in 1651, two years after the execution of Charles I, and two years before Cromwell's assumption of a Dictatorship. Hobbes assumed that the state of nature, instead of being, as Rousseau subsequently and less historically contended, a golden age from which man had progressively degenerated, was a state of perpetual war. In that state the life of man was consequently 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.' From that intolerable condition man had painfully escaped by means of a mutual *contract*. Under the terms of that Contract the individual citizens had agreed to confer supreme and unlimited authority upon the Sovereign. From these premises Hobbes deduces his theory of Sovereignty, his justification of Absolutism. But in the present connection the significance of Hobbes's analysis consists, not in his argument in favour of Absolute Sovereignty, but in his

insistence upon the machinery of a Contract or Covenant as a means of escape from a state of war. From a relapse into that brutish condition the Sovereign must protect the subjects who to that end have endowed him with absolute power. But should the Sovereign lack the force or the will to perform the primary function of his being, the citizens are free to renounce obedience, and resume the right of self-protection. 'The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Sovereignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in another's sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it.'¹

The political philosopher is thus in complete accord with the jurist: political society rests upon Contract.

Much more important in the present connection than Hobbes's *Leviathan* was William Penn's *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*, published in 1694. Penn was neither a technical jurist nor a formal philosopher. He was a religious mystic, and a practical philanthropist: he devoted his life to improving the lot of his fellow-men, more particularly that of his co-religionists—the 'Society of Friends of Truth' familiarly known as the Quakers. It was primarily as an asylum for them that Penn founded in North America the great colony that has perpetuated his name and memory.

¹ *Leviathan*, c. xxi., Oxford Ed., p. 170.

It was in accord with the principles professed by the Quakers that Penn devised his project for the Peace of Europe. The contribution made by the English Quakers to the cause of international peace is, however, so important as to demand a separate chapter. That chapter must needs carry us far beyond the limits of the Age of Louis XIV. Postponing, therefore, further reference to Penn's Essay, we may conclude the present chapter with an examination of another work, the most elaborate, perhaps the most important, of all the theoretical plans for the organization of Peace.

'PROJET' OF THE ABBÉ DE SAINT-PIERRE.—The author of that plan was Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, commonly known as the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Born in Normandy on February 13, 1658, Saint-Pierre died in Paris in 1743. He spent half his long life in cultivating the society of great men and fine ladies, and in the study of literature; the other half he spent in devising innumerable projects for the improvement of mankind. Like Daniel Defoe's, the Abbé's brain teemed with 'projects' which ranged over a wide and varied field, from international law to the education of young women and the reform of spelling, from the reform of taxation to the improvement of the drama and the pulpit, but only with one of them—that for making peace perpetual—are we now concerned. The impulse to the composition of this elaborate treatise came partly, it would seem, from a study of Sully's *Memoirs* and partly from the author's own adventure in diplomacy. In 1712 Saint-Pierre was appointed secretary to the Abbé de Polignac, one of the three representatives of France at the Peace Conference at Utrecht. That Conference arranged the terms of the famous Treaty which

closed the half-century of Louis XIV's wars. At Utrecht in 1713 the *Projet* was first published in two volumes. A third volume was added in 1717, and in 1729 the author published an abridgment, an act of prudence and consideration to which the Essay probably owed such limited circulation as it obtained.

The full title of the abridgment is significant: 'Abrégé du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle, inventé par le roi Henri le Grand, approuvé par la reine Elizabeth, par le roi Jacques, son successeur, par les républiques, et par divers autres potentats. Approprié à l'état présent des affaires générales de l'Europe, démontré infiniment avantageux pour tous les hommes nés et à naître en général, et en particulier pour tous les souverains et pour les maisons souveraines. Rotterdam, 1729.'

This title definitely connects Saint-Pierre's Essay with *The Great Design*, modestly, albeit shrewdly, suggesting that the later work merely contains an elucidation of the scheme attributed by Sully to his master. As a fact, Saint-Pierre's Essay is much more than that. The twenty-four States of Christian Europe were to form a permanent Grand Alliance or European Union. Each was to have equal representation (one delegate, two substitutes, and two agents to take the place of the substitutes) in the Senate of Peace which was to sit permanently at Utrecht. The President or Prince of Peace was to be changed weekly. Each State was to contribute, on a scale to be determined monthly by the Union, in proportion to its net revenues, towards the current expenses of the organization and the maintenance of the international force. Though cumbrous in form and undistinguished in style, and even in the abridgment terribly prolix, the *Projet* is incomparably the most complete and coherent scheme ever formu-

lated for the avoidance of war and the perpetuation of peace.

The *status quo*, both as regards territory and Government, was to be taken as the starting-point of the whole scheme, and was to be guaranteed by the scheme in perpetuity. The Sovereigns were 'to have full and lasting security for the preservation of their persons, for the preservation of their States, complete, such as they are in actual possession of, and security for the lasting preservation of their posterity on the Throne, in spite of conspiracy, sedition and revolts of their Subjects.'¹ But this article could be altered 'with the consent of the Union by three-fourths of the four-and-twenty voices.' Ordinary rules, to secure the objects of the Union, might be made or amended by a majority vote of the Senate, provided that nothing be altered in the five fundamental articles of association without the unanimous assent of all the Confederates.²

Treaties will never be more than truces so long as they are unilateral, and are not placed under the guarantee of the Union—or 'permanent Society'. To this end the Senate will act as permanent Tribunal, a compulsory Court of Arbitration 'both to secure the execution of their past agreements, and to regulate without war their future claims and disputes.' (Article III, p. 55.)

If any confederate refuses to abide by the award or prepares for war or makes a treaty incompatible with the regulations of the Union, he shall be put under the ban of Europe and shall be compelled by force of arms to carry out the award, or give security to make good the harm caused by his hostilities, and to repay the cost of the war as estimated by the Delegates of the Union. (Article IV, pp. 28–9.)

¹ *Abrégé*, p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 56.

The armed force was to be supplied by equal contingents from the Confederated States, 'but to make the levying and maintaining a great number of troops easy to the less powerful, the Union shall furnish them with what money is necessary and that money shall be furnished to the Treasury of the Union by the most powerful Sovereigns who shall pay in money the surplus of their extraordinary quota.' The special force was to be placed under the command of a Generalissimo appointed by a majority vote, and he was to have command over the Generals of the troops of the united Sovereigns, but the Generalissimo was not to be a member of a Sovereign family and his appointment was to be revocable at pleasure.¹ In peace time the army of the more powerful States was not to exceed that of the less powerful Confederates, viz. 6000 men. With the consent of the Union, however, a very powerful Sovereign might maintain additional troops provided they were all foreigners.

Thus did Saint-Pierre boldly grapple with the crux of the problem. If the League was to function effectively for the preservation of peace or the punishment of a transgressor, it must, in his judgment, have at its disposal a force sufficient to compel obedience to the decrees of the International Court. He was, in fine, in complete accord with Hobbes that 'Covenants without the sword are but words.'

Until Rousseau reduced to order the chaotic arguments of Saint-Pierre the latter was not taken very seriously. The personality of the man inevitably excited ridicule, and his scheme offered an easy target to the shafts of satire. The comment of Frederick the Great was characteristic: 'The Abbé

¹ Ed. 1714, pp. 151-2.

de Saint-Pierre has sent me an excellent treatise on the means of restoring peace to all Europe and on the manner of preserving it continually. The thing is exceedingly practical, nor is anything wanting for its accomplishment except the consent of all Europe and some other such trifles.' Not dissimilar was that of Cardinal Fleury, who is said to have observed: 'Admirable! Save for one omission; I find no provision for sending missionaries to convert the hearts of princes.' Cynical as these comments were, they pierced to the heart of the problem. No scheme, however cunningly devised, can function effectively unless there has been, among princes and peoples, a real change of heart. When that change of heart has taken place, elaborate machinery may prove to be superfluous. It is on a change of heart that the Society of Friends has always insisted as the only real foundation on which it is possible to build the edifice of World-Peace. To the position of that Society, and the specific contributions its members have made to the literature of Peace, the next chapter must be devoted.

QUAKERS AND PEACE

WILLIAM PENN'S 'ESSAY TOWARDS THE PRESENT AND
FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE' (1693-4)

'I TOLD them I lived in the virtue of that life and power that took away the occasion of all wars: and I knew from whence all wars did rise, from the lust, according to James his doctrine.' Thus did George Fox answer Cromwell's Commissioners when they pressed him to take up arms for the Commonwealth against the King. His words have provided the text for all the preaching and practice of the Society of Friends on the subject of war, from that day to this. Thomas Hobbes, like Hugo Grotius, sought, as we have seen, a means of escape from the brutalities of war in a Social Compact—a legal instrument. The followers of George Fox based their repudiation of the sword upon the voice of the living God speaking to the heart and conscience of the individual man.

Among those followers the most conspicuous, the most historically important in the present connection, was William Penn. His *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an European Dyet of Parliaments or Estates* is the most significant contribution ever made by a member of the Society of Friends, ever made by any Englishman, to the literature of the subject. For that reason it demands analysis.

Penn's attitude towards war was the common heritage of

the sect whose doctrines he had espoused. The principles, to which from first to last the Quakers (to adopt the familiar nickname, first bestowed upon the young Society by Gervase Bennett in 1650) adhered, were laid down by the founder of the Society of 'Friends of Truth', George Fox.

George Fox (1624-91) was the son of a Leicester weaver in comfortable circumstances. He was himself apprenticed to a shoemaker who also carried on business as a grazier and wool merchant. But Fox, sensitive to the movements of religious thought in the England and Europe of that day, was impelled to go forth and seek counsel from Puritan pastors throughout the shires. The quest was not in vain, but the light which presently broke in upon his soul came, as he believed, from no earthly source, through no human intermediary, but direct from the Great Ruler of the Universe. Nor did it come through any written revelation. 'Though I read the Scriptures that spoke of Christ and of God, yet I knew Him not (except) by revelation.' So Fox records in his Journal. 'This revelation,' writes a commentator, 'the light of Christ within, is the central truth of Quaker teaching.' Thus there came into being during the Civil War the *Society of Friends of Truth*. The methods of the Friends have never been propagandist, but Fox himself was possessed of an hypnotic personality, and, on innumerable journeyings throughout the land, communicated his own experiences to all who would listen. The common people heard him gladly and joined the new Society in their thousands.

Frowned upon by Anglicans, and still more by the dominant Presbyterians, as spiritual anarchists, the Quakers rejected every form of external organization. They had neither 'Church' nor Priesthood. Every man and woman was,

Fox declared, a priest, and might be a prophet, if moved thereto by the Spirit. But to no man, priest or layman, bishop or King, would the Quaker bow the knee or doff the cap. All without distinction should be addressed as 'thou'. Simplicity in dress was carried to a point that became ostentation, though nothing was further from the Quaker's mind. Purity of life was the natural consequence of following the guidance of the 'inner light'. But the most distinctive and the most enduring tenet of the Quaker's creed was the refusal to use any weapons save soul weapons. The repudiation of war came not, however, from the observance of any scriptural precept: it was a necessary consequence of the doctrine of Christian Charity. War would automatically cease when the 'occasion' of war was taken away. Put away envy, hatred, malice and uncharitableness, and man would no longer fight: there would be nothing to fight about.

But there was plenty to fight about as things were in the seventeenth century, and the refusal of the Quakers to bear arms brought them into trouble during the military dictatorship of Cromwell. It was not only as conscientious objectors that the Quakers were persecuted; their opinions were held to be blasphemous, and their violent attacks on the clergy, and their frequent brawling in church, disturbed the public peace. So Fox himself and thousands of his disciples became familiar with the inside of many a gaol. The Protector intervened to mitigate the harshness of his officials, and in 1654 summoned Fox to a personal interview at Whitehall. The interview evoked cordiality on both sides. 'I spoke much to him,' writes Fox, 'of truth; and a great discourse I had with him about religion, wherein he carried himself very moderately.' Cromwell was evidently impressed by the fer-

vour and sincerity of his strange visitor. 'As I spake, he would several times say it was very good and it was truth. And as I was turning to go away he catches me by the hand, and, with tears in his eyes said: "Come again to my house; for if thou and I were but an hour of a day together, we should be nearer one to the other;" adding, that he wished me no more ill than he did to his own soul.' To this kindly reception Fox characteristically responded by warning the Protector to beware of hardness of heart and to listen to the voice of God.

Cromwell immediately ordered that Fox should be released from custody; in October 1656 he set free a number of imprisoned Quakers, and in 1657 issued a general order to all local justices, 'in dealing with persons whose miscarriages arise rather from defects in their understanding than from malice in their wills, to exercise too much lenity than too much severity.' A large number of imprisoned Quakers were accordingly liberated.

The Declaration issued by Charles II from Breda (1660) promised liberty to tender consciences, and ought to have improved the position of the Quakers. Unfortunately, however, in January 1661, the crazy sect known as the Anabaptists raised an abortive insurrection. It was never formidable, but in the blind panic that ensued no distinction was drawn between those violent anarchists and the peace-loving Quakers, who were dragged off to prison in their thousands. But this poor and persecuted sect was soon to obtain an influential recruit. Fox's followers were for the most part drawn from the humblest strata of society. William Penn was a man of a different type: the son of a distinguished admiral, a Christ Church undergraduate—though sent down for refusing to conform to the ecclesiastical discipline of the

University—the protégé of the Duke of York (heir-presumptive to the Throne), an accomplished man of the world.

William Penn, though a prominent figure both in English and American history, remains, despite much laborious research, something of an enigma. Macaulay, while admitting his conspicuous virtues, bespattered his name with vituperation. Yet unless Penn was a complete hypocrite he was indubitably a saint. But was he also a conspirator? He refused to take an oath, but was he not forsworn? The most conspicuous among the 'Friends of Truth,' did he scruple to lie to save his skin? Did he, though refusing to pay tithe, become 'a broker in simony of a most discreditable kind' and seduce the College (Magdalen) from the path of right? He faced persecution with courage; did he quail before the terrors of a prosecution which might have cost him his life?

The *Dictionary of National Biography* devotes no fewer than eighteen columns to Penn's life, but fails to solve the enigma. It may be, as the *Dictionary* maintains, that Macaulay's bitter accusations rest upon confusion between Penn and one or more other Penns and Pennes, but Macaulay had already considered this possibility, rejected it, and refused to retract. As an avowed Jacobite, and deeply indebted to James II, Penn was naturally suspect to a Whig partisan like Macaulay; yet Penn's latest biographer is fain to admit failure to clear Penn from 'the imputation of duplicity,' though he attributes it to 'preliminary signs of mental disorder.'¹ It is not, however, as courtier or as politician that Penn deserves to be remembered. He was evidently not a strong man: his powers of imagination exceeded his capacity for administration; his schemes were greater than his achievements. Nevertheless,

¹ C. E. Vulliamy: *William Penn* (G. Bles, 1933), pp. 229 f.

in the history of the United States he will be held in everlasting remembrance as the founder of the great colony of Pennsylvania; in world-history his fame rests upon the fact that he was among the first to conceive and to formulate a Plan for World-Peace.¹

The constitution of the American Colony and the Essay on the Peace of Europe evidently emanated from the same brain, and were inspired by the same hope. Both were 'holy experiments'. The vast territory to the west of the Delaware, conveyed to Penn in liquidation of a debt owed by the Crown to his father, was to afford an asylum for the persecuted Quakers and other oppressed peoples of the old world. 'Government seems to me,' writes Penn in the Preamble, 'a part of religion itself, a thing sacred in its institution and end.' Immense pains were accordingly taken both by Penn himself and his friend, Algernon Sidney, in drafting the Constitution. Based on the principles of pure Democracy, the Government was to be 'for the support of power in reverence with the people, and to secure the people from the abuse of power; for liberty without obedience is confusion, and obedience without liberty is slavery.' The Government was, accordingly to rest upon Consent; in form it was to be completely representative. In striking contrast to the narrow intolerance of the New England Colonies, all forms of religion, consistent with monotheism and religious liberty, were to be tolerated in Pennsylvania.

In the like spirit Penn framed the Treaty which in 1682 he concluded with the North American Indians, a treaty (according to Voltaire) unique in diplomatic history, 'le seul

¹ The eighteen columns of the *D.N.B.* contain no reference to the Peace Plan!

entre les peuples et les Chrétiens qui n'ait point été juré, et qui n'est point été rompu.' The famous speech in which the Founder commended his Treaty to the Indians breathes the very spirit of Quakerism: 'The Great Spirit who made you and me, who rules the heavens and the earth, and who knows the innermost thoughts of men, knows that I and my friends have a hearty desire to live in peace and friendship with you, and to serve you to the utmost of our power. It is not our custom to use hostile weapons against our fellow creatures, for which reason we have come unarmed. Our object is not to do injury, and thus provoke the Great Spirit, but to do good. We are met on the broad pathway of good faith and goodwill, so that no advantage is to be taken on either side, but all to be openness, brotherhood and love.'

Penn was, however, more enlightened as a legislator than successful as an administrator; the Quakers had not yet developed that aptitude for business that afterwards became so marked a feature of the Society; consequently, the high hopes entertained by Penn for a settlement based on the principle of fraternal love were not entirely fulfilled. Nevertheless, despite some friction between the Proprietor and his subjects, the Colony grew rapidly and prospered exceedingly.

The principles embodied in the *Frame* of Pennsylvania were applied to a wider sphere in the Essay on the Peace of Europe.

This Essay was the fruit of a period of retirement and reflection. The retirement was due to Penn's suspected implication in treasonable correspondence with James II. He vehemently protested his innocence; the Government apparently regarded him, even if guilty, as politically negligible. Nevertheless, for some three years (1691-3) he remained in

hiding. Suspected on the one hand by the Government, William Penn was still more gravely compromised with his own people. 'His grave dalliance with James, his airs at Whitehall, his ministerial graces had alarmed the Quakers,' writes his latest biographer, 'and aroused their suspicion. . . . Barclay and Fox were dead, and Penn should now have been a great leader of the movement. Instead of that he was nervously moving from place to place, precariously sheltered in secret lodgings, peeping through a hole in the shutters, dark in mind, even petulant, a man of a sorrowful and a broken spirit.'¹

Under these circumstances was the famous Essay on Peace conceived. It was first published in 1694, three years before the Treaty of Ryswick ended the war between Louis XIV and the great European Coalition formed against him by William III. It was that monarch's acceptance of the English Crown that had brought England into the Grand Alliance, and involved her in a war which was never really ended until Napoleon was defeated by Wellington on the field of Waterloo.

Penn's Essay on Peace was a paradoxical prelude to this prolonged period of war. 'He must not be a man,' he wrote, 'but a Statue of Brass or Stone whose bowels do not melt when he beholds the bloody tragedies of this war.' 'What can we desire,' he asks, 'better than peace,' but just as we cannot realize the blessing of health without a bout of sickness, so we cannot 'finally know the comfort of peace, but by the smart and penance of the vices of war.' Peace, however, can only be based upon and maintained by justice; justice involves Government. Just as Society has escaped

¹ Vulliamy: *William Penn*, p. 233.

from a state of war by a plan of Government based upon Consent, and as the citizens 'hold their liberty by true obedience to rules of their own making,' so the Sovereign Princes of Europe may base a new European order upon a representative system—may bring into being a European Parliament. Let all the Sovereigns, as representing their respective States, send Deputies to an Imperial or Sovereign Dyet, to which all disputes not settled by direct negotiation between the States must be submitted. If any Sovereign refused so to submit a dispute or to abide by the award, or sought a remedy by arms, or delayed compliance with the award by a date fixed by the Dyet, all the other Sovereignities 'united as one strength' were to 'compel the Submission and Performance of the Sentence with Damages to the suffering Party and Charges to the Sovereignities that obliged their Submission. To be sure,' Penn added, 'Europe would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed peace to her harassed inhabitants; no Sovereignty in Europe having the power and therefore cannot show the will to dispute the conclusion; and consequently peace would be procured and continued in Europe.' Penn suggested that the representation in the Dyet should be fixed as follows: Germany 12, France and Spain 10 each, Italy 8, England 6, Portugal 3, Sweedland, Poland and United Provinces 4, Denmark and Venice 3, the thirteen Swiss Cantons 2, and Holstein and Courland 1. If Turkey and Muscovy came in, they were to have 10 apiece. The actual vote might be given by a single delegate (as in the *Bundesrath* of the German Empire of 1871), but the vote was to be multiplied to the strength of the representation. Thus the French delegate's vote would be counted as 10, and so on. The Presidency of the Dyet was to go in rotation to the

delegates of the Constituent States; voting was to be by ballot, but no abstention or neutrality was to be permitted, and for all decisions a three-fourths affirmation was to be required.

A further detail anticipates modern practice. 'To avoid Quarrel for Precedence, the Room may be Round, and have divers Doors to come in and go out at, to prevent Exceptions.' Finally, Penn in his Summary 'enumerates some of those many *real* Benefits that flow from this Proposal for the Present and Future Peace of Europe.' Not the least is that it will prevent 'the Spilling of so much humane and Christian blood'; it will 'in some degree recover the reputation of Christianity . . . in the sight of infidels'; it will tend to public economy and permit the diversion of funds wasted on war to social reform, to education, to the promotion of trade, etc.; it will facilitate the mutual intercourse of different nations by affording such 'ease and security of travel and traffic' as has not been known since the break up of the Roman Empire 'into so many Sovereignities'; by the admission of the Ottoman Empire to the Federation Europe will be secured against Turkish inroads far more effectually than by a Christian Crusade for the expulsion of the infidel from Europe. It will encourage mutual hospitality and intercourse between Sovereigns: 'it were,' he says, 'a great motive to the tranquillity of the world if that they could freely converse face to face, and personally give and receive marks of civility and kindness. An hospitality that leaves these impressions behind, will hardly let ordinary matters prevail, to mistake or quarrel one another.' Incidentally, it will enable Princes to marry for love, and so eliminate the dynastic factor from the problem of European peace.

Several points of great significance emerge from a closer analysis of Penn's remarkable Essay. No scheme for the

perpetuation of peace can, as we have seen, be expected to survive unless it is based upon justice. 'Justice is the means of peace . . . it prevents strife and at last ends it . . . peace is maintained by justice which is a fruit of Government.' (Chap. II.) Nor is there any reason why the principles of justice, applied successfully in the administration of the household and the State, should not be extended to the whole Commonwealth of Nations. 'By the same rules of justice and prudence by which parents and masters govern their families, and magistrates their cities, and Estates their republics, and princes and kings their principalities and kingdoms, Europe may obtain and preserve peace among her Sovereignities.' (Section 10.) But the administration of justice demands an ultimate sanction. Penn, we observe, does not shrink from the logical conclusion of his argument. 'Covenants without the Sword are,' wrote Hobbes, 'but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. If there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and lawfully may, rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men.' The passages quoted above make it clear that Quaker though he was, Penn, like Hobbes, contemplated the use of military sanctions to enforce, if need were, the decisions of his European Dyet. Man had not yet reached that stage of development when the Civil Power could dispense with a police force. 'So depraved is human nature that, without compulsion some way or other, too many would not readily be brought to do what they know is right and fit, or avoid what they are satisfied they should not do.' (Chap. III.)

'*Some way or other.*' But how? Few theorists would dissent from the conclusion to which the logic of Hobbes relentlessly conducts them: 'Covenants without the Sword are but words.'

But to whose hands is the sword to be entrusted by the Sovereign? How is an international police force to be constituted? These are problems of detail which have thus far baffled the practical politician. Intellectual assent to a logical conclusion is one thing; to work out the details of an acceptable and workable scheme is another and much more obstinate task.¹

JOHN BELLERS'S ESSAY.—How far Penn's conclusions found support among his co-religionists it is impossible to say, but in 1710 John Bellers, one of his Quaker friends, advanced *Some Reasons for an European State*, substantially in accord with those given by Penn, and accepting, as did Penn, the inevitability of force as the ultimate Sanction of an International Tribunal.

John Bellers (1654–1725) was a man of substance, the son of an affluent tradesman in the City of London. By his marriage with a Gloucestershire heiress, a Quaker lady of good family, he improved his social position and obtained possession of a small landed estate at Coln St. Aldwyn. Until recent years Bellers was best known as the author of a book bearing the title, *Proposals for Raising a College of Industry of all useful Trades and Husbandry with profit for the Rich, a plentiful living for the Poor and a good education for Youth which will be an advantage to the Government by the Increase of the People and their Riches*. This work, published in 1795, led, some years later, to the foundation of a 'School and Workshop' at Clerkenwell, and this establishment after some vicissitudes has 'taken modern shape as a large co-education

¹ Penn's Essay is included in a volume of Selections from Penn's writings in Everyman's Library, *The Peace of Europe* (No. 724), and considerable extracts from it are printed in the Grotius Society Publications, No. 4 (1927).

boarding school at Saffron Walden.¹ The views of John Bellers commended themselves so warmly to Robert Owen that he reprinted this work in his *New View of Society* (1818). Communists and Socialists claimed him as one of their spiritual ancestors, if not actually one of themselves. Marx quotes extensively from the *Proposals*, and H. M. Hyndman declares (*Socialism in England*, 1883) that the book contains 'some of the most luminous thoughts on Political Economy ever put on paper.' That Bellers was a genuine lover of his kind none can question. His busy brain was ever devising schemes for the benefit of mankind, especially for the amelioration of the lot of the sick and needy, the friendless and the prisoners. But among the large number of pamphlets, religious, social and political, that proceeded from his pen the only one that immediately concerns us is *Some Reasons for an European State proposed to the Powers of Europe by an Universal Guarantee, and an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet or Parliament to settle any Disputes about the Bounds and Rights of Princes and States hereafter. With an Abstract of a Scheme formed by King Henry IV of France upon the same subject. And also a proposal for a general Council or Convocation of all the different religious persecutions in Christendom (not to dispute what they differ about but) to settle the general principles they agree in; by which it will appear that they may be good subjects and neighbours though of different apprehensions of the way to Heaven. In order to prevent broils and wars at home, when foreign wars are ended.* (London, 1710.) Bellers follows closely the lines laid down by his friend, William Penn, but with an important addition. As in Penn's scheme, there was to be an annual congress of all the Federated States of Europe.

¹ M. E. Hirst: *The Quakers in Peace and War*, p. 165.

Representation in the Congress was, however, to be in proportion to territory, and in order to facilitate this method Europe was to be divided into one 'hundred or more cantons of such a size that every Sovereign State shall send at least one member to the Congress: the larger States, containing several cantons, would send proportionately more. Each canton was to make an equal contribution in men, ships or money to the armed forces of the Federation and to be entitled to send one member to the Congress for each unit of Contribution.' Like Penn, but unlike Henry IV (whom he censures for Exclusiveness), Bellers would have included Russia and Turkey in his Federation, since 'The Muscovites are Christians and the Mahometans men, and have the same faculties and reason as other men.'

To his appeal to the Princes of Europe Bellers adds an appeal to the bishops, clergy and religious teachers, adjuring them to support his proposal for the creation of a General Ecclesiastical Council or Convocation. This Council was not to dispute about the points on which the various churches differ but to 'settle the General Principles they agreed in; by which it will appear that they may be good subjects and neighbours, though of different apprehensions of the way to Heaven.' 'If a man but lives,' he concluded, 'agreeable to the public peace his error in opinion cannot hinder a better Christian from heaven. . . . Remove but the various passions that cloud men, and then truth will be discovered by its own light. Imposing religion without reaching the understanding is not leading men to heaven. Men will not be saved against their wills.'¹ The critical reader will observe that Bellers

¹ M. E. Hirst: *The Quakers in Peace and War*, pp. 166-9, and cf. *Quakers and Peace* (Grotius Society Publications), p. 31.

appends to his own plan an abstract of the *Grand Dessein* of Henry IV. The question obtrudes itself: whence did Bellers (like Saint-Pierre a few years later) derive his knowledge of Sully's scheme if the latter was not formulated until 1745? But critical questions, though intriguing, are, as already explained, outside the scope of the present work. It must suffice to say that Bellers's work, like Penn's, attests the wide interest aroused by the problem of Peace during the latter years of the age of Louis XIV.

Discussion of a problem is not, unfortunately, the same thing as the achievement of a solution. Subsequent chapters will show that the discussion was almost continuous during the two centuries that followed on the publication of the works of Penn and Bellers; but the solution is not yet.

Meanwhile, the Society of Friends continued, throughout the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, instant in their efforts to promote the cause of international peace. Nor did they ever depart from their resolution to take no part, direct or indirect, in the waging of war. 'Our principles and our practice have always been to seek peace and ensue it. All bloody principles and practice . . . we do utterly deny, with all outward wars and strifes, and fightings with outward weapons for any end or under any pretence whatever, and this is our testimony to the whole world.' To this position stated by George Fox in 1660 they steadfastly adhered. But in practice adherence was not always easy, and many of the wealthier Quakers, especially the bankers and shipowners, found it difficult in times of war to rebut the charges of inconsistency brought against them, not only by their opponents but by Friends.

Notably was this the case during the long struggle (1792

1815) against Republican and Napoleonic France. Nor could the Quakers altogether avoid conflict with Authority when, under various *Militia Acts*, Parliament found it increasingly necessary to call upon the whole young manhood of the nation to bear arms. Quakers were, as a rule, exempted from personal service, but difficulties arose in connection with payments in lieu of service, fines, distrains, and the like, and not least in regard to the payment of taxes levied specifically for war purposes.

For all the inconsistencies and difficulties that arose there was only one effective and radical remedy—the abolition of war. Towards that goal the Quakers ardently pressed throughout the period that followed Waterloo. Most of the Peace Societies which, from 1816 onwards, were established in increasing numbers owed their initiation to Quakers, and were largely maintained by their efforts. To these developments reference will be made in a later chapter. The present chapter has already outrun chronological sequence. It is time to resume it.

VI

THE AGE OF REASON

PHILOSOPHERS AND PEACE: ROUSSEAU, BENTHAM AND KANT

THE preceding chapter was mainly parenthetical: we now regain the chronological high road. The *Projet* of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, published in 1713, was a natural if paradoxical conclusion to the age of Louis XIV—a century of war.

The succeeding period has been indifferently designated as 'The Age of Reason', the Age of 'Administrative Absolutism', of the 'Illuminés', of 'Enlightened Despotism'. The labels are all appropriate. If the period did not precisely fulfil Plato's ideal, if the rule of the philosophers was far from universal, the eighteenth century (1715–89) was characterized by the advent to power of Kings and Statesmen who were not unmindful of the dictates of philosophy, and who were anxious, by administrative reforms of a drastic character, to promote the well-being of their respective peoples. Frederick the Great, Voltaire's disciple in Prussia, the Emperor Joseph II, lord of the great Hapsburg domains, Leopold, another Hapsburg Prince in Tuscany, Charles III and D'Aranda in Spain, Pombal in Portugal, Turgot in France—all were intent on effecting administrative and economic reforms, and all proposed, as De Tocqueville has pointed out, to effect their object by the same means. 'They wished,' says that acute commentator, 'to borrow the hand of the central power, and to employ it to break up everything, and then to remake it on

a plan they themselves had invented. This central power alone seemed to them capable of accomplishing such a task.' Thus reform (as so often) preceded, perhaps precipitated, revolution. Anyway, reform was in fact interrupted by revolution—an interruption greatly deplored by radical reformers of an academic type. Such an one was the late Mr. Goldwin Smith, who wrote: 'No greater calamity ever occurred, no greater disaster ever befell the cause of human progress, as it seems to me, than the Revolution which brought the Liberal Movement of the Eighteenth Century to a violent crisis in France.'

WARS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—That crisis was in fact provoked, partly by the intellectual interest fomented by the philosophers, partly (if paradoxically) by the reforms initiated by benevolent autocrats, and not least by the social conditions prevailing among large sections of the population. The coincidence of progressive thought and material misery is by no means a unique phenomenon. Reforms, suddenly initiated and impatiently carried through, are apt to stir stagnant waters.

Not that either philosophy or reform was the main pre-occupation of the statesmen of the eighteenth century. Internal reforms were carried through amid the clash of arms. Between the publication of the Peace *Projet* of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and the conclusion of the Holy Alliance (1815) lay a century of almost continuous wars. England and France were the protagonists, while Austria, fighting now against France and now in alliance with her, was consistently opposed to the parvenu Power of Prussia.

But the outstanding fact of the period was the long-drawn-out duel between England and France. From the English

Revolution in 1688 down to the close of the revolutionary period in France and the overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, England and France were, with short and rare intervals, at war—and not seldom on three continents. The War of the Grand Alliance (1688–97) was, indeed, definitely European; but the War of the Spanish Succession, despite its European title, marked the beginning of the prolonged contest between England and France for World Supremacy. By the Treaty of Utrecht the foundations of British Canada were laid by the possession of Newfoundland, by the acquisition of Nova Scotia (Acadie) and the Hudson Bay Territory. The cession to England of Gibraltar and Minorca under the terms of the same Treaty assured her supremacy in the Mediterranean. By the *Asiento* England obtained, besides other valuable commercial rights, the profitable but infamous privilege of supplying Spanish America with negro slaves.

The *Asiento* gave rise to perpetual quarrels between English merchants and Spanish officials in the West Indies. In 1739 an outrage by a Spanish *guardacosta* upon an English merchant captain led to the outbreak of the war known to Europe as the 'War of the Austrian Succession', but to England as the 'War of Jenkins's Ear'. France came in as the ally of Spain in 1744, and the war widened out into a world-struggle fought not in Europe only, but in India and North America. As regards the protagonists, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which brought the war to an end (1748), was no more than a truce. By 1756 England and France were again at war; and this time it was decisive. The victories of Clive and Coote made the English East India Company supreme over all European rivals in Bengal and Madras. The French did, indeed, retain Pondicherry, but only as a commercial

settlement. Politically they ceased to count in India. Equally decisive was the war as regards North America. Thanks to the victories of Hawke and Boscawen at sea, and the victories of Wolfe and Amherst on land, Canada was lost to France and added to the North American possessions of the British Crown. Florida was ceded to Great Britain by Spain. The victory of England was, in truth, dangerously complete. The expulsion of her chief rival from the American Continent left her own colonies free to indulge, if temptation offered, in the luxury of rebellion. The fiscal policy of the Home Government supplied the irritant, and the thirteen colonies were lost to the British Empire. The acknowledgment of their independence was, however, followed by the migration of a great body of Empire Loyalists, for whom the United States were no longer a home, into New Brunswick and Ontario. Thus a British Canada was added by settlement to the French Canada which had passed to Great Britain, twenty years earlier, by conquest.

Nearer home, on the European Continent, there had been war almost continuously between 1733 and 1783. The so-called war of the Polish Succession (1733-8) was followed by that of the Austrian Succession (1740-48); that again by the Seven Years' War (1756-63), while in the war between Great Britain and her Colonies (1773-83), France, Spain and Holland were actively involved, and the Northern Powers showed persistent hostility to the maritime policy of Great Britain.

Within a decade after the conclusion of the American War there broke out (1792) the war initiated by revolutionary France, and that war was not finally brought to an end until Napoleon was beaten by Wellington at Waterloo (1815).

War was, then, in the eighteenth century, as it had been

in the seventeenth and in the sixteenth, the normal condition of Europe. What wonder that, under these circumstances, the minds of serious thinkers should have turned again to the contemplation of schemes for securing to the world the blessings of peace?

ROUSSEAU'S 'PAIX PERPÉTUELLE.'—Among the philosophers so employed three stand out pre-eminent.

Rousseau had, it seems, in youth, some slight acquaintance with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and had conceived a great admiration for the man and his writings—not least for his *Project of Perpetual Peace*. Realizing, however, that the Abbé's cumbrous and careless style negatived the possibility that his views might attract general attention, Rousseau sought and obtained leave to re-edit his chief work. In 1761 he published a new edition of the Abbé's abridgment, and the whole work with Rousseau's criticism was subsequently given to the world, though not until 1782—four years after the author's death.

The substance of the original work is scrupulously preserved by Rousseau, but in style and arrangement it is transformed out of recognition. With the alchemy of genius Rousseau transmuted base metal into pure gold. Only the skeleton is Saint-Pierre's: the flesh and blood are supplied, with all his accustomed literary felicity, by Rousseau. It is accordingly in Rousseau's version that the modern reader will be well advised to study the work of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.¹ In style Rousseau never wrote anything more brilliant.

¹ It may be read in Miss Nuttall's excellent edition where the French and English are printed side by side (Cobden Sanderson), or in C. E. Vaughan's translation.

One specimen of it has been already quoted (*supra*, pp. 20-21), but only lengthy quotation, here out of place, could do it full justice. As regards the substance of the essay, an abstract of an abstract would be as dull as it is otiose. To the main argument, however, Rousseau prefixed his own brilliant introduction, and appended to it his own conclusion. The conclusion is disquieting. If, says Rousseau, the Abbé's plan has not been adopted it is not because it was not a good one: it was too good; but it could only have been carried out 'by violent means which would have staggered humanity.' 'There is no prospect,' he added, 'of federation leagues being established otherwise than by revolutions, and on this assumption which of us would venture to say whether this European League is more to be desired or feared? It might perhaps do more harm at a single stroke than it could prevent for centuries.' Rousseau's warning was not superfluous.

BENTHAM'S PLAN FOR AN UNIVERSAL AND PERPETUAL PEACE (1786-9).—From France to England: from the philosopher of Revolution to the apostle of Utilitarianism; after Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham. It is not pretended that in the case of Bentham, any more than in that of Rousseau, his Peace Project constitutes his chief title to fame. But only with it are we here concerned. Bentham (1748-1832) published his *Principles of International Law* on the eve of the French Revolution. Of the four essays contained in that work the third was entitled: *War Considered in respect of its Causes and Consequences*; the fourth was *A Plea for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*.¹ Bentham's internationalism was of a piece

¹ Printed with Introduction by C. J. Colombos in the Grotius Society Publications (Sweet & Maxwell), 1927.

with his general theory of utility. The aim of the legislator should be to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The 'greatest number' could not be fewer than all the peoples of the habitable globe. The public good could have no narrower limit. The real statesman must concern himself not merely with the well-being and happiness of his own fellow-subjects, the handful of human beings who might accidentally be collected on a given territory, and might by custom speak a common language. His object should be to promote the common and equal utility of all nations.

What could be more detrimental to the common interests of mankind than war? What was better calculated to promote them than Universal and Perpetual Peace?

Supplementary to these two essays was a third, *Emancipate Your Colonies*, which was published in 1793 and was addressed to the National Convention of Republican France. It adjured France, and all other countries, voluntarily to give up all their Colonies and Dependencies. As regards France the adjuration was, at the moment, of little practical or immediate significance, since all the oversea possessions of France were presently swept up by the English Navy. With England, it was a very different matter. The voluntary surrender of all Colonies was, however, an essential part of Bentham's Peace Plan—an indispensable preliminary to universal tranquillity.

Bentham aimed at three supreme objects: (i) the simplification of the machinery of government and the reduction of the functions of the State to a minimum; (ii) a strict limitation of national expenditure; and (iii) Peace, permanent and universal. Influenced very largely by the teaching of Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), and still more by that of Adam Smith (1723–90), whose great work on *The Wealth of Nations*

was published in 1776, Bentham had convinced himself, and did his utmost to convince others, that it was definitely against the interests of Great Britain to retain any Colonies or Dependencies; to make any Treaties, offensive, defensive, or commercial; to keep up any navy, beyond the minimum that was necessary for defence of commerce against pirates, or to retain on the Statute Book any legislation, such as the Navigation Acts, designed for the protection of British trade, or the sustenance of the British Navy. Following Adam Smith he held that trade was limited by the amount of capital available at any given moment, and that consequently it was less profitable to embark on 'round-about' trade with distant Dependencies, where the returns on capital were necessarily slower, than to encourage home trade where the nimble sixpence could do the work of the slow shilling.

Even more important than the development of trade was the increase of security and the avoidance of war. If only she divested herself of her oversea possessions Great Britain need not apprehend injury from any nation on earth. France had nothing to fear from anyone but Great Britain, and if she also were quit of her Dependencies she would have nothing to fear from England.

Moreover, the abandonment of Colonies would be a clear gain both to the Mother-Country and the Colonies. The Mother-Country would save much useless expenditure; it would diminish the risk of war either with the Colonies or with foreign nations in defence of them; it would get rid of the corruption involved in Colonial patronage, and would simplify the whole machinery of government and so greatly improve domestic administration. To these general arguments in favour of a renunciation of *all* oversea possessions, Bentham

added a number of particular arguments in favour of abandoning Gibraltar and the East Indies.

If the Mother-Country would gain by abandoning her Colonies, equally would the Colonies benefit by emancipation. Emancipation would diminish the risk of bad government due either to a clash of interests or to sheer ignorance on the part of administrators sent out to govern Dependencies. You cannot, said Bentham, want a Colony except for the purpose of governing it badly. Govern it well; and it is no use to you! 'Govern it as well as the inhabitants would govern it themselves, you must choose them to govern it whom they themselves would choose . . . you must take those measures and none others which they themselves would take. But would this be governing, and what would it be worth to you if it were?' Bentham's practical suggestions then were: Maintain in your Colonies no military forces or works; pay nothing towards the administration of the Colonies; nominate officials only if, and so long as, the Colonies ask you to do so, and instruct your Governors to assent to all Bills presented to them. Above all, remember that trade is limited by capital, and consequently that no legislation, no bounty, no tariffs, or anything of the sort can increase it. Do not therefore ask for or concede preferential rates; make no wars to impose, or alliances to obtain them; above all, give no encouragement to individual traders by giving them bounties, or by taxing or prohibiting their trade competitors.

Having thus, as he supposed, swept away the impediments to international amity, Bentham proposed positively to promote it by various expedients. He proposed to establish an International Court of Judicature but not to entrust to it any coercive power; to set up a Common Legislature or Diet,

and to place under the ban of Europe any State which refused obedience to its decrees; and, finally, to prohibit Secret Diplomacy.

In the sphere of domestic policy and legislation Bentham exercised for half a century or more a most powerful influence. Sir Henry Maine affirmed that he did not know a 'single law reform effected since Bentham's day which could not be traced to his influence.' His was the philosophy which inspired the politicians of the Manchester School. But that is a great subject to which we shall return later. In the International sphere the effect of his teaching was almost negligible; but to the Colonial policy of his own country he imparted a bias from which it was not emancipated until the last decades of the nineteenth century. Bentham's teaching received, it should be said, a powerful impetus on the theoretic side, from the philosophical ascendancy of the French Physiocrats and in particular from that of Turgot; in the domain of practical politics, it derived immense support from the successful revolt of the American Colonies, and the acknowledgment of their independence. Turgot had taught that Colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only until they ripen. The American Colonies had ripened: the fruit had fallen. Bentham hoped and helped to gather it.

KANT'S 'PERPETUAL PEACE.'—An echo to Bentham's voice came from Germany. In 1795 Immanuel Kant published his famous *Treatise on Perpetual Peace* (*Zum ewigen Frieden*). Born at Königsberg in 1724, Kant was the son of Prussian parents, and the grandson of a Scottish emigrant. At the moment when he published his *Essay on Peace*, Prussia, after three years of war against France, had just made peace on

terms which, though advantageous to herself, shamelessly sacrificed the interests of Germany to those of Prussia. The terms of the bargain between Prussia and the French Republic were registered in the Treaty of Bâle (1795). They do not concern us. Thenceforward for ten years, despite the appeals of her former allies, despite the insults heaped upon her by Napoleon, Prussia stolidly persisted in a neutrality that involved ever deepening humiliation. Threats, importunity, proffered bribes, availed naught to penetrate the obstinacy of the Prussian King. But at last, in 1805, the worm turned. In October 1805 Marshal Bernadotte marched his army through the Prussian territory of Anspach. The Prussian King was at last stirred to action by the crowning insult, and declared war on Napoleon, but only to suffer a crushing defeat at Jena and Auerstadt, and to witness the dismemberment of his country under the Treaty of Tilsit.

But this is to anticipate events. In 1795 Kant was looking out on a Europe in the throes of war, and considered how peace—perpetual peace—could be established. For *established* it must be. Kant, though confessing himself a purely theoretical politician—‘a mere pedant,’ was, unlike Rousseau, under no illusion as to a golden age of peace, from which man, embarrassed by the conditions of civilized Society, has progressively degenerated. Like Hobbes, Kant visualized the state of nature as a state of war. ‘Although,’ he explained, ‘there is not always perhaps actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace must be *established*. For the mere cessation of hostilities is no guarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee is given by every individual to his neighbour [Hobbes’s influence is apparent here], which can

only be done in a state of Society regulated by law, one man is at liberty to challenge another, and treat him as an enemy.'

How then is peace to be *established*? Kant begins by laying down the Preliminary Articles of Peace between States as follows:

1. 'No Treaty of peace shall be regarded as valid if made with the secret reservation of material for a future war.'

Such a peace is a mere truce, a mere suspension of hostilities, not peace. Unless there be an honest intention to preserve peace for the future, treaty-making can be justified only by Jesuitical casuistry.

2. 'No State—great or small—having an independent existence shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.'

A State is not a *patrimonium*, but a society of human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to rule, or to dispose of it.

3. 'Standing armies shall be abolished in course of time.'

Such armies are themselves, he holds, the cause of wars of aggression, undertaken to get rid of the burden of maintaining them. War chests are also a serious menace to peace.

4. 'No national debts shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the State.'

Internal—or even external—loans for economic development are, of course, wholly unobjectionable; but foreign loans form 'a great obstacle in the way of perpetual peace.'

5. 'No State shall violently interfere with the Constitution and administration of another.'

The only exception to this rule is in the case of civil war, when, two States having virtually come into existence,

foreign help may legitimately be sought and given. This is a noteworthy exception.

6. 'No State at war with another shall countenance such modes of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent state of peace; such as employment of assassins or of poisoners, breaches of capitulation, the instigation or making use of treachery in the hostile State.'

These rules refer, however, only to the prevention or cessation of hostilities. Peace, if it is to endure, needs to be *established*. How is this to be accomplished? Kant's answer is to lay down what he describes as three 'definite Articles of Perpetual Peace.' The first is: 'The civil constitution of each State shall be republican.' The 'republic' was not necessarily to be democratic; it might be monarchical in form; the essential point was that it should be representative, that the citizens of the State should be free, and enjoy equality of rights before the law. 'Republic' is not opposed to monarchy, but to despotism, and its essential differentia Kant discovers (like Montesquieu) in the separation of powers, in severing the executive from the legislature. The essential principle of despotism is that 'the State arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself made.'

The second 'definitive Article of Perpetual Peace' runs: 'The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free States.' Kant repudiates the idea of a super-State, but insists that the only alternative to international anarchy and perpetual war is some form of voluntary federation. 'Without a compact between the nations the state of peace (which is a moral duty) cannot be established or assured. Hence there must be an alliance of a particular kind which we may call

a covenant of peace (*foedus pacificum*) which would differ from a treaty of peace (*pactum pacis*) in this respect, that the latter merely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to put an end to war for ever.' The federation would preferably develop gradually. 'If Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a commonwealth—which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for other States wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the States, in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation would extend further and further.'

Is it too much to suggest that Kant seems to envisage a League of Nations gradually developing from the protoplasm provided by the British Commonwealth of Nations, and extending its sphere of beneficent activity by a series of regional Pacts? Evidently he advises cautious advance. Ultimately you may have 'a State of nations which would finally embrace all the peoples of the earth.' But the world is not ready for that. If you move too fast towards the realization of that ideal you may risk losing all the ground you have won. *Festina lente*, move on cautiously, making each step sure before you take the next.

The third Article may be briefly dismissed: 'The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the condition of universal hospitality.' Perpetual peace presupposes free intercourse and freedom of exchange. Attempts at isolation have been made by less civilized nations, but they are not compatible with that idea of cosmopolitan right which is a complement of the unwritten code of law, the code dictated by 'the great artist, Nature.'

Kant's Essay had, we must regretfully admit, no influence whatever on contemporary events. Its publication was followed by twenty years of practically continuous war. When war at last ceased in 1815, the Czar Alexander I published his famous Scheme for a *Holy Alliance*.

VII

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

ON September 26, 1815, there was enacted on the plain of Vertus near Chalons a picturesque and truly memorable scene. We may recall the situation. The Iron Duke had lately won his final victory at Waterloo. The Emperor Napoleon—once more 'General Buonaparte'—was a prisoner on his way to exile in St. Helena. The allied armies were for the second time in occupation of the French capital; in Paris, too, were powerful rulers, and the leading diplomatists of Europe, negotiating the terms of the final Treaty of Peace. They were assembled, on September 26, at Chalons, to witness a grand review of the allied troops—English, Austrians, Prussians, Russians and Swedes. In this brilliant gathering the most spectacular, if not the greatest, figure was that of the Czar Alexander I, autocrat of all the Russias. The Czar seized the dramatic opportunity to proclaim to the world, and commend to his allies, a project which had long lain near his heart, and had recently taken definite shape in a Treaty concluded between himself and his brother Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia (September 14). That Treaty is known by the grandiloquent title of *The Holy Alliance*.

Between the conclusion of the Holy Alliance and the publication of Immanuel Kant's *Essay on Perpetual Peace* exactly twenty years had elapsed. Throughout all those years,

with a brief interlude (1802-3), war had raged in Europe, and at times beyond its borders in Egypt, India, South Africa and America.

To meet the menace of a Napoleonic domination, coalition after coalition had been formed. The main burden of resistance to Napoleon's schemes of conquest had fallen upon Great Britain; but Austria, despite repeated and disastrous defeats, had again and again renewed the struggle; Russia too had played an important though less consistent part, and in the penultimate campaigns had joined with Austria and Prussia to inflict the *coup de grâce* upon the Corsican adventurer. But it was Great Britain, and in particular her great minister, Lord Castlereagh, who had kept together a coalition which had repeatedly threatened to dissolve before the supreme object had been attained. Her long purse, her unbroken supremacy at sea, the military genius of Wellington, the diplomatic skill of Castlereagh—these were the main factors in bringing the prolonged contest to a final and triumphant issue.

In the territorial readjustment of the Continent, Great Britain had, however, only a secondary interest. Her Mediterranean highway must be guarded by the retention of Gibraltar and Malta; the Low Countries must be made strong enough to resist the attacks of France, but, apart from that, the supreme interest of Great Britain then, as ever, was peace.

THE CZAR ALEXANDER I.—Great Britain had been not less reluctant to intervene in a European War in 1793 than she was in 1914. In both cases her intervention was determined by the assault of a great Continental Power upon the Low Countries. Not until that danger was dispelled could

she sheathe the sword so reluctantly drawn. But from the outset of the war her supreme object was the attainment of a peace on terms which should give promise of security and permanence. Consequently, Pitt lent a ready ear to the advances initiated by the Czar Alexander, with a similar purpose, towards the end of 1804. From the correspondence which ensued between the two Governments it is clear that the ideas embodied in the *Act of the Holy Alliance* were not a sudden inspiration, due to the opportunity of 1815, but that they had long been germinating in the imaginative, if unstable, brain of the Czar. Alexander I was a curiously complex character: a religious mystic not devoid of worldly ambition, a man of generous temper and true Muscovite cunning, he combined lofty idealism with calculated shrewdness. Particularly susceptible to personal influences, he was apt to vary his convictions with each change of counsellors and companions. From his Swiss tutor, Frédéric César de la Harpe, a disciple of Rousseau, he had imbibed the sour milk of Jacobinism. The Baron von Stein, Prussian reformer and German nationalist, had impressed upon Alexander the significance of nationality as a factor in politics. Prince Adam Czartoryski, his Polish aide-de-camp, must share with Alexander's Egeria, the Baroness von Krüdener, the credit of persuading the impressionable Czar to apply to the conduct of diplomacy the precepts of Christianity, and so planting the seed which fructified in the Holy Alliance.

Those seeds had been germinating for ten years or more. In 1804, when negotiations were in progress for the formation of the Third Coalition against Napoleon, the Czar sent his confidential counsellor, Nikolai Nikolaievich Novosiltsov, to lay his views before Pitt and the Foreign Secretary, Lord

Harrowby. His views are contained in secret instructions given to M. de Novosiltsov, signed by the Czar himself and countersigned by Prince Adam Czartoryski.¹ The instructions showed that the Czar was anxious to reach complete accord with England both as regards the territorial reconstruction of Europe, and also the mutual relations of its independent states. 'The adoption (wrote the Czar) of the course above indicated in intimate concert with England would not only be the true and perhaps the only means of restricting French Power within its just limits, but would also contribute to fix the future peace of Europe on a solid and permanent basis.' 'It seems to me,' he added, 'that this great aim cannot be looked upon as attained until, on the one hand, the nations have been attached to their Governments, by making these incapable of acting save in the greatest interest of the people subject to them, and on the other the relations of States to each other have been fixed on more precise rules and such as it is to their mutual interest to respect. . . . Nothing would prevent at the conclusion of peace a treaty being arranged which would become the basis of the reciprocal relations of the European States. It is no question of realizing the dream of perpetual peace, but one could attain at least to some of its results if, at the conclusion of the general war, one could establish on clear, precise principles the precepts of the rights of nations. Why could one not submit to it the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obligation of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediations of a third party could offer have been exhausted, until the grievances have by this means been

¹ The instructions are printed in Czartoryski's *Memoirs* (trs. Gielgud), vol. ii. pp. 41-51 (Remington, 1888).

brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been made? On principles such as these one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league of which the stipulation would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, which, sanctioned by the greater part of the nations of Europe, would, without difficulty, become the immutable rule of the Cabinets, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union.'

His Britannic Majesty, in his Speech at the opening of Parliament (January 15, 1805), referred in complimentary terms to the Emperor of Russia, 'who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe.'

PITT'S POLICY.—Four days later (January 19) Pitt replied to the Czar's Note. He reported the 'inexpressible satisfaction' with which the King regarded the 'wise, dignified and generous' policy which the Emperor of Russia was disposed to adopt; he expressed his pleasure at learning that the views and sentiments of Russia coincided so exactly with those of Great Britain, and emphasized his wish to 'form the closest union of Councils with the Emperor and concert of measures.' Pitt then defined with precision the objects to be kept immediately in view: (i) To reduce France to the limits of 1792; (ii) To provide for the 'tranquillity and happiness' of the territories thus recovered from France and to establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandisement of that Power; and (iii) To form on the restoration of Peace a general agreement and guarantee for the mutual protection and

PITT'S MEMORANDUM

security of the different Powers, and for re-establishing a general system of public law in Europe, and so ensuring its safety. He discussed in detail the territorial readjustments necessary to secure these ends, laying special stress on the restoration to complete independence of the Low Countries and of Switzerland, and on the strengthening of the position of Austria, Prussia and Sardinia, as the best means of resisting the preponderance of France in Europe. Subsequent discussions with Russia made it clear that on two points Great Britain was adamant: the retention of Malta and the integrity of her maritime rights. In the meantime, Pitt cordially agreed with the Czar Alexander that at the end of the war there must be concluded a General Treaty by which the European Powers should mutually guarantee each other's possessions. 'Such a Treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public law, and would powerfully contribute to the repression of future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity. Above all, a mutual guarantee would render abortive every project of aggrandisement like those which had produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous advent of the French Revolution.'¹

In this remarkable document Pitt not only outlined the ultimate settlement of 1815, but expressed cordial concurrence with the Czar's view that, as soon as the war ended, an effort must be made to put the future peace of Europe on a surer basis, and that the Treaty embodying that object should be placed under the special guarantee of Great Britain and Russia—the only Powers who 'by their position' (the words are the

¹ This document is in the Public Record Office. Alison describes it as 'the most remarkable State-Paper in the whole Revolutionary War', and prints a long extract from it in his *History of Europe* (ed. 1849), vol. vi. pp. 667–8. So also does Phillips (*The Confederation of Europe*, pp. 37 f.).

Czar's) 'are invariably interested in the reign of order and justice in Europe, the only ones who by their position can maintain it, and, being free from conflicting desires and interests, will never trouble this felicitous tranquillity.'

But valuable and important as was Pitt's concurrence, the credit of initiating the idea of a League to enforce peace belongs primarily to the Czar of Russia.¹

The immediate fruit of Novosiltzov's mission was the conclusion of the Treaty (January 1805) between Great Britain, Russia and Austria, which formed the basis of the Third Coalition. The Coalition was broken into fragments by Napoleon's great victory at Austerlitz. Pitt lived only just long enough to hear the news of that disaster; but his mantle fell upon his disciple, Lord Castlereagh, who eagerly embraced his master's views and carried them into effect. The instructions, which (drafted by himself) he took with him from the Cabinet to the Allied Headquarters at Bâle (January 1814), were framed entirely in the spirit, and reproduced the specific terms, of Pitt's *Memorandum* of January 1805. Almost to the last detail were Pitt's terms reaffirmed in the Instructions which ended thus: 'The Treaty of Alliance is not to terminate with the War, but is to contain defensive engagements with mutual obligations to support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of stipulated succours. The *casus foederis* is to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties.'² That paragraph formed the basic principle of the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1, 1814);

¹ Cf. *L'Empereur Alexandre 1^{er}* (i. 170), by the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, who repudiates the notion that the idea of a Holy Alliance owed anything either to Mme von Krüdener or to Metternich.

² For further details see Marriott's *Castlereagh* (1936) (chapters xiii. and xv.). A portion of the *Instructions*, in Castlereagh's own handwriting, is there reproduced in facsimile.

it reappears in the Treaty of Vienna (1815) and in the Quadruple Alliance (November 20, 1815).

Meanwhile, the Czar had remained constant, if not in his actual alliances, at least in adherence to his theoretical ideas as adumbrated in the Note of 1804. To those ideas he recurred in the Preamble to the Treaty of Kalisch concluded between Russia and Prussia (February 28, 1813) on the eve of the War of Liberation: 'The time will come when treaties shall be more than truces, when it will again be possible for them to be observed with that religious faith, that sacred inviolability, on which depends the reputation, the strength and the preservation of Empires.' Nearly a year later, when the liberation of Germany had been successfully achieved, and the Czar, with his allies, was about to cross the Rhine, the same principles were reaffirmed, and the Czar again declared his fixed resolve to place all the nations 'under the safeguard of a General Alliance.'

THE HOLY ALLIANCE.—The Holy Alliance, then, was due to no sudden inspiration; it was not the offspring of a brain intoxicated by victory; it was not evoked by a mood of momentary exaltation. To the terms of that Alliance we recur. The three Sovereigns, grateful for the favours vouchsafed by Divine Providence to the allies, and convinced of the necessity of 'settling the steps to be observed by the Powers, in their reciprocal relations, upon the sublime truths which the holy religion of our Saviour teaches,' solemnly declare that 'the present Act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Government, to take

for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which far from being applicable solely to private concerns should have an immediate influence upon the counsels of Princes and should guide all their steps. . . . Consequently, Their Majesties have agreed on the following articles:

‘ART. I. . . . The three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and . . . will, on all occasions, and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and . . . will lead [their subjects and armies] in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace and Justice.

‘ART. II. . . . the three allied Princes, looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the One family . . . thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom power really belongs . . . recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

‘ART. III. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is . . . that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.’¹

¹ For the full text here reproduced almost in its entirety cf. Hertslet: *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. i. pp. 317–19.

The Prince Regent of England, though immediately and pre-eminently invited to adhere to the Alliance, felt himself precluded 'by the forms of the British Constitution' from formally acceding to the Treaty, but conveyed to the august signatories his 'entire concurrence in the principles they had laid down, and in the declaration they had set forth of making the Divine precepts of the Christian religion the invariable rule of their conduct in all their relations, social and political.' Most of the other Sovereigns of Europe, including the Kings of France, the Netherlands, Würtemberg and Saxony, and the Governments of the Swiss and the Hanse Confederations did, in fact, adhere to it. Metternich, at the moment, regarded the whole transaction with cynical contempt, though he subsequently made use of the alliance to promote the ends of his reactionary policy. Castlereagh, like most Englishmen, shrank from the ostentatious profession of religious motives in politics, and regarded the manifesto as a 'sublime piece of mysticism and nonsense.' His reception of the Project was, therefore, though studiously polite, characteristically ironical. 'The benign principles of the Alliance of the 26th of September may,' he wrote, 'be considered as constituting the European system in the matter of political conscience. It would, however, be derogatory to the solemn act of the Sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic obligations which bind State to State, and which are to be looked for alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed form.' Castlereagh had, moreover, grave doubts as to the sanity of the Czar. Canning was more suspicious of his sincerity. But Canning was brought into immediate relations with the Holy Allies only after the alliance had been perverted to reactionary ends.

That perversion was primarily due to Metternich. In its inception the Holy Alliance represented a noble, if impracticable ideal. The Czar's mood was an exalted one: his motives were, at the moment, pure. 'I want the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia'—so he wrote to Mme von Krüdener from Paris—'to join me in this act of adoration in order that the world may see us, like the Magi of the East, recognizing the authority of God our Saviour. Unite with me in prayer to God that He will dispose the hearts of my allies to sign'. As a modern French historian pertinently declares: '*Croire que l'Alliance fût fondée pour restreindre les droits des peuples et favoriser l'absolutisme, c'était calomnier les intentions les plus pures des souverains.*'

Nevertheless, the motives of the Czar and his august allies were from the outset suspect. In order to correct certain malevolent misapprehensions, the Czar published, in March 1816, a statement setting forth to the world the ideas which had in fact inspired the allies and the objects at which the alliance aimed. 'Deeply impressed,' wrote the Czar, 'by the sufferings inflicted upon the world by the recent wars, they sought to apply more effectively to the secular and political relations of States the principles of peace, concord, and love which are the fruit of religion and Christian morality. These principles had been, far too long, narrowed in their application, and to this restriction must be attributed that series of calamities from which the world has so long suffered. Only by an application to international relations of the principles of fraternity and love is it possible to restore respect for solemn engagements and the enjoyment of liberty, personal and political. Such were the motives which had inspired the Act of the Holy Alliance; its sole and exclusive object was to

maintain peace, and to reconcile all the moral interests of the peoples whom Divine Providence had been pleased to unite under the banner of the Cross.'

THE QUADRUPLÉ TREATY.—Meanwhile, Lord Castlereagh had provided the soul of the Holy Alliance with a terrestrial body.

The Quadruple Treaty, signed on the same day as the Second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815), was based upon the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna. The Four Powers solemnly renewed those Treaties, guaranteed the Second Treaty of Paris, pledged themselves to maintain the exclusion of Buonaparte and his family from the throne of France, and undertook, if the Revolution should again 'convulse France and thereby endanger the repose of other States, to concert . . . the measures which they may judge necessary . . . for the safety of their several States and for the general tranquillity of Europe.' Finally, they agreed 'in order to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world, to renew their meetings at fixed periods . . . for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests and for the consideration of the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.' This Treaty laid the foundations of that 'Concert of Europe' which was the crown of Lord Castlereagh's diplomatic career. Until his death, in 1822, the Quadruple Treaty governed the international relations of the Great Powers of Europe.

The general principle of a Concert of Europe must needs command universal assent; but that the Concert might,

unless vigilantly watched, menace the cause of liberty in individual States—particularly in the smaller States—was a truth ever present to the mind of Castlereagh. Perceiving this danger, he addressed a circular letter to the British representatives at foreign courts (December 1815). He insisted on the value of ‘open diplomacy’ and instructed them to ‘adopt a direct method of intercourse in the conduct of business, and to repress . . . the spirit of local intrigue. Especially should they do everything possible to allay any jealousies on the part of the smaller Powers and any apprehensions that the Great Powers had created machinery to keep others in check.’ In particular the smaller Powers should be assured that British policy was ‘founded on no separate view of interest or ambition’; of possessions and fame Great Britain can desire no more; the only desire of the British Sovereign is ‘to employ all His influence to preserve the peace which in concert with His allies he has won.’

CASTLEREAGH’S POLICY,—‘To turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace.’ That was the policy of Great Britain; that was the supreme object of Castlereagh’s diplomacy.

Two dangers threatened: on the one hand, the revolutionary temper provoked by the orgy of reaction into which some of the restored monarchs—notably the Bourbons in Spain and Naples—immediately and insanelly plunged; on the other, the spirit of repression. France had taught Europe that domestic revolution may easily develop into international war. The Holy Allies had learnt that lesson. Autocrats in Austria and Russia naturally watched with anxiety any assault upon autocracy in the rest of Europe.

Nevertheless, for three years after Waterloo, Castlereagh, despite the increasing restlessness of the Holy Allies, and despite the deepening suspicion of the British Parliament, managed to keep the Concert unbroken. In September 1818 the Powers, according to arrangement, met at Aix-la-Chapelle. France, having provided for the payments due to the allies, was relieved of the army of occupation and was formally readmitted to the polite society of Europe. In general terms the Quadruple Alliance, now transformed by the admission of France into the 'moral pentarchy', was renewed, but Castlereagh made it clear that Great Britain would resist any attempt to exercise surveillance over the smaller Powers in the interests of autocracy.

In 1820 revolution broke out in Spain, and the infection quickly spread to Portugal and Naples. Metternich, who from Vienna ruled Italy with a rod of iron, was determined to suppress it in Naples. Austria had, by treaty, unquestionable rights of intervention in Naples. The Czar Alexander had no such rights in reference to Spain, and Castlereagh was determined that the Czar, itching as he was to go to the assistance of the Bourbon despot in that country, should not be allowed to do so. Castlereagh's protest averted Russian intervention in the Peninsula, but, against his wish, a Congress was summoned to meet at Troppau (October 1820).

That Congress brought the Concert to an inglorious end. The Holy Allies issued a Protocol affirming the doctrine that if European order was threatened by a domestic revolution the allies were entitled, nay bound, to bring back the offending State, 'by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, into the bosom of the Great Alliance.'

Against this doctrine Castlereagh promptly circulated an

emphatic protest. The Troppau Protocol was 'in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of this country.' It would 'inevitably sanction . . . a much more extensive interference in the internal transactions of States than . . . can be reconciled either with the general interest, or with the efficient authority and dignity of independent Sovereigns.' In further support of his policy Castlereagh drafted a Cabinet Memorandum which was adopted *in extenso* by Canning, and subsequently published by him as a justification of his policy. Canning has thus obtained credit which belongs to Castlereagh. But that is a personal detail.¹

By the Troppau Protocol and Castlereagh's repudiatory Dispatch the issue was definitely joined. The inherent difficulties of collective action—of a Holy Alliance, a Concert of Europe, a League of States—stood revealed in all their nakedness. On the rocks of intervention the Holy Alliance foundered. There is no need on that account to doubt the sincerity of its author. The Czar honestly hoped to inaugurate the reign of righteousness and peace. Castlereagh equally desired peace. But the Czar thought, rightly, that peace was threatened by revolution. Castlereagh insisted, not less justly, that it was menaced by intervention. From the dilemma thus presented escape was well-nigh impossible. To point the moral is easy. That is the function of the historian. To reconcile in practice the contradiction is immeasurably difficult. That problem baffled the statesmen of 1820: a century has not sufficed to solve it.

¹ See Marriott: *Castlereagh* pp. 311-12.

VIII

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE

EVERY great war has been followed by an attempt to organize perpetual peace. The Napoleonic Wars were no exception to this rule. Sovereigns and subjects were alike weary of war. The Holy Alliance represented a genuine attempt to end war by building the structure of peace upon the only foundation that will endure—the Gospel of Christ. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. The Holy Alliance was quickly prostituted to the service of autocracy. Nevertheless, a whole generation passed without a general war in Europe.

The peoples—notably the English-speaking peoples—were at least as sincere as their rulers in their desire for peace, and were not less active in promoting it. The motives of the early Pacifists were definitely religious. In 1815 David Low Dodge, a New York merchant, published a pamphlet, *War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ*, and in the same year he founded in that city the first World Peace Society. Almost simultaneously a similar Society was founded by Dr. Noah Worcester in Massachusetts, and a third by two Quakers in Ohio.

The English Quakers were not far behind their American brethren.¹ In June 1816 they founded in London a Society for the promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace.

¹ For the earlier peace-efforts of the English Quakers, see *supra*, chapter v.